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JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CODES AFTER REPUBLICAN  
PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE 
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INTRODUCTION 
The vast majority of judicial offices in the United States are subject 
to election.  The votes of the people select or retain at least some 
judges in thirty-nine states, and all judges are elected in twenty-one 
states.1  By one count, 87% of the state and local judges in the United 
States have to face the voters at some point if they want to win or re-
main in office.2  Judicial elections, however, differ from elections for 
legislative or executive offices in a number of significant ways.  In 
nineteen states, most judges are initially appointed but must later go 
before the voters in a so-called retention election—in which there is 
no competing candidate but voters are asked simply whether they ap-
prove of the incumbent—in order to keep their positions.3  In twenty 
of the states that provide for electoral contests between competing ju-
dicial candidates, some or all judicial elections are nonpartisan, even 
though candidates for other state offices are elected on party lines.4  
Most strikingly, virtually all states that provide for judicial elections 
 † Vice-Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law. 
1 See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES:  APPELLATE AND 
GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS 3, 7-14 (2004) (charting the methods of judicial selec-
tion and retention for all fifty states), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/Judicial 
SelectionCharts.pdf (last accessed Oct. 7, 2004).
2 Robert C. Berness, Note, Norms of Judicial Behavior:  Understanding Restrictions on 
Judicial Candidate Speech in the Age of Attack Politics, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027, 1028 
(2001). 
3 AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 7-14 (noting the use of retention elec-
tions in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming).  In addition, unopposed judges run for retention in 
Montana.  Id. at 10. 
4 Id. 
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also impose campaign codes that restrict the election-related activities 
of judicial candidates to a far greater extent than these states regulate 
the campaigns of executive and legislative candidates.  Generally 
adopted by rule of the state’s highest court rather than by statute, 
these codes, inter alia, limit what judicial candidates may say in their 
campaigns, restrict how they raise campaign contributions, and curtail 
their ability to engage in partisan political activities other than sup-
port for their own candidacies. 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court sharply called into 
question the constitutionality of state judicial campaign restrictions.  
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,5 a closely divided Supreme 
Court invalidated the provision of the Minnesota Code of Judicial 
Conduct that precluded judicial candidates from “announcing” their 
views concerning disputed legal and political questions.  White found 
that the First Amendment applies to a judicial campaign code and, 
therefore, the code’s restriction on campaign speech should be sub-
ject to strict judicial scrutiny.  The Court cast doubt on the primary ra-
tionale for the campaign canons—preserving the impartiality and the 
appearance of impartiality of the state judiciary6—and expressed skep-
ticism with regard to the notion that even if judicial impartiality is a 
compelling state interest, that interest may be advanced by campaign 
speech restrictions.7  Moreover, the Court emphasized the positive 
value of enabling judicial candidates to express themselves on dis-
puted political and legal questions.  As the Court stated, those are 
“what the elections are about.”8
Although Justice Scalia’s majority opinion observed that “we nei-
ther assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns 
for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office,” the 
Court also pointedly declined to find that the First Amendment allows 
greater regulation of judicial election campaigns than of other elec-
tions.9  Rather, noting the important lawmaking role of American 
courts, the majority concluded that the dissenters “greatly exagger-
ate[d] the difference between judicial and legislative elections.”10  
White’s treatment of the judicial impartiality rationale and its applica-
tion of the narrow tailoring requirement raise questions about 
5 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
6 Id. at 775-78. 
7 Id. at 779-83. 
8 Id. at 788. 
9 Id. at 783. 
10 Id. at 784. 
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whether any judicial campaign restriction could pass strict scrutiny.  
The decision casts a shadow of unconstitutionality over the entire pro-
ject of judicial election campaign regulation. 
In the eighteen months since White, federal courts have held un-
constitutional a number of state judicial campaign restrictions that 
were not at issue in White.11  Similarly, a number of state courts have 
revised their canons, including provisions not at issue in White, to 
make them less restrictive.12  To be sure, many state courts have re-
tained their canons and have rejected First Amendment challenges to 
the restrictions on judicial campaign and partisan political activities 
that the canons impose.13  But the constitutionality of the state canons 
that subject judicial campaigns to greater regulation than legislative or 
executive campaigns remains uncertain. 
In this Article, I will consider three questions raised by White.  
First, does the Constitution require that all elections be run according 
to the same set of rules?  That is certainly the implication of those 
judges and commentators who have argued that, having chosen to se-
lect or retain judges by election, the states must abide by the constitu-
tional requirements that apply to elections.14  However, as I will discuss 
11 Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n 
on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 351 
F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003). 
12 See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5B(1) (amended Dec. 22, 2003) 
(prohibiting judicial candidates from making statements “that commit the candidate 
with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that could come before the courts” but no 
longer prohibiting statements that “appear to commit” the candidate).  Compare GA. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B (amended Jan. 7, 2004) (removing the prohi-
bitions against both “pledges or promises” by candidates and the personal solicitation 
of campaign contributions), and N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (amended 
Apr. 2, 2003) (deleting prohibitions against judicial candidates’ “pledges or promises” 
and personal solicitation of campaign funds), with GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 7B (2000), and N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (1998). 
13 See, e.g., In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (finding that the 
state’s canons were sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 124 
S. Ct. 180 (2003); In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 350 (Me. 2003) (concluding that 
canon restricting speech was “narrowly tailored” to serve a compelling state interest), 
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1722 (2004); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (N.Y. 2003) (per 
curiam) (finding the rules restricting judicial political activity “narrowly tailored to fur-
ther a number of compelling state interests”); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 
2003) (per curiam) (holding “New York’s pledges or promises clause—essential to 
maintaining impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in the state judiciary—is 
sufficiently circumscribed to withstand exacting scrutiny under the First Amend-
ment”). 
14 See, e.g., Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321 (“White suggests that the standard for judicial 
elections should be the same as the standard for legislative and executive elections.” 
(emphasis added)); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Campaigns in the Shadow of Republican 
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in Part I, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld variations in the 
constitutional norms that govern a number of the fundamental fea-
tures of elections.  Indeed, the constitutional rules of elections may 
differ according to what is at stake in the election.  If campaign prac-
tices that are unexceptionable (or even constitutionally protected) in 
the context of legislative or executive elections have a distinct and 
harmful impact on the judicial function, then they can be restricted in 
judicial election campaigns. 
Second, even if it is theoretically legitimate to apply rules to judi-
cial campaigns that are more restrictive than those that govern execu-
tive and legislative elections, are the specific rules in the state judicial 
conduct codes constitutional?  These canons preclude judicial candi-
dates from making “pledges or promises” or other statements that 
“commit or appear to commit” candidates with respect to cases or le-
gal issues;15 penalize misrepresentations and misleading statements;16 
bar judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign 
Party of Minnesota v. White, PROF. LAW., Fall 2002, at 2, 22-23 (Fall 2002) (“The First 
Amendment . . . does not allow judges to impose restrictive rules that try to take the 
politics out of political campaign speech.  If states choose to elect judges instead of ap-
pointing them, that choice limits the subsequent power of the state to regulate the ju-
dicial elections.”). 
15 See, e.g., Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 313 
(W.D. Ky. 1991) (“The canon . . . prohibits, in broad language, pledges and promises 
of conduct in office and commitments with respect to issues likely to come before the 
court.”); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 88 (“Each of the charges . . . involved implicit 
pledges that if elected to office, Judge Kinsey would help law enforcement.”); Deters v. 
Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Ky. 1994) (charging judicial 
candidate with violating the Kentucky’s Commit Clause because he promoted himself 
as a pro-life candidate); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 5 (“[P]etitioner’s campaign effec-
tively promised that, if elected, he would aid law enforcement rather than apply the 
law neutrally and impartially in criminal cases.”). 
16 See, e.g., Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1316 (finding a misleading campaign brochure in 
violation of Canon 7(B)(1)(d)); Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 
207, 211 (Ala. 2001) (charging a judicial candidate with distributing “false informa-
tion” about his opponent); In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 958 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam) 
(“Respondent made knowing misrepresentation about the incumbent judge’s judicial 
record during the course of her candidacy for office.”); Summe v. Judicial Ret. & Re-
moval Comm’n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Ky. 1997) (determining that a judicial candidate 
misrepresented campaign literature as an independent endorsement by a newspaper); 
In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Mich. 2000) (“[The court] narrow[s] the canon to 
prohibit a candidate from either knowingly or recklessly using forms of public com-
munication that are false.”); In re Miller, 759 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2000) 
(“[H]e is charged with disseminating information in the course of his campaign for 
election as judge . . . which, allegedly, misrepresented his position and qualifications in 
violation of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.”). 
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contributions;17 and restrict partisan political behavior.18  Although White 
noted that Minnesota’s “pledges or promises” clause was not at issue 
in that case,19 two decades earlier the Court had held in a nonjudicial 
election that the First Amendment protects the freedom of candidates 
to make campaign promises.20  Moreover, even before White, the lower 
federal courts and state courts had been troubled by the canons’ pen-
alties for misrepresentations.21  Since White, two courts have invalidated 
restrictions on personal solicitation and partisan political behavior.22
17 See, e.g., Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322-23 (“[C]andidates are completely chilled from 
speaking to potential contributors . . . .”); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme 
Court, 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Canon 7 . . . prohibits personal solicitation of 
campaign funds by a candidate for judicial office.”); In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d at 348 
(“[W]e sought to prevent the appearance of, or the ultimate corruption of, the judicial 
process by preventing judges from soliciting contributions in support of their own po-
litical ambitions.”); In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 32 (Or. 1990) (per curiam) (“Personal 
solicitation of campaign funds by a candidate for judicial office is forbidden by Canons 
7 B(7) and 7 D of the Code of Judicial Conduct . . . .”); cf. Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. 
Supp. 1518, 1527-28 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (holding unconstitutional a time limitation on 
period for solicitation and a restriction on contributions to judicial candidate cam-
paigns). 
18 See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 
80 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (charging judicial candidate who served as keynote speaker at par-
tisan political function with violating provisions of New York’s Code of Judicial Con-
duct); Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 704 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding as constitu-
tional a canon forbidding a judicial candidate from using funds raised for a campaign 
for a different elected position); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1292 (distinguishing be-
tween furthering one’s own campaign and engaging in partisan activity in support of 
other candidates). 
19 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002). 
20 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
21 See, e.g., Butler, 802 So. 2d at 218 (suggesting the canon chills judicial speech by 
punishing unintentionally mistaken rather than intentionally false statements); In re 
Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 42 (expressing concern that the more broadly drawn canon 
encourages judicial candidates to be silent on key issues rather than risk making unin-
tentionally misleading remarks); In re Miller, 759 A.2d at 471 (opining that a broad in-
terpretation of First Amendment rights and a narrower reading of the canon protects 
the judiciary’s “image and integrity”). 
22 Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321-22; Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 90.  The personal solicita-
tion and partisan behavior restrictions had also been at issue in the White litigation.  
The plaintiffs in White had challenged the Minnesota canons that dealt with judicial 
candidates’ partisan activities and personal solicitation of funds, as well as the state’s 
Announce Clause.  On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district 
court granted summary judgment to the state defendants and upheld both the per-
sonal solicitation and partisan activity canons.  Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. 
Supp. 2d 967, 986 (D. Minn. 1999).  The Eighth Circuit affirmed.  247 F.3d 854, 885 
(8th Cir. 2001).  Plaintiffs sought certiorari to review the Eighth Circuit’s decision up-
holding the partisan activity and the Announce Clause canons (but not review of the 
decision upholding the anti-personal solicitation canon), but the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari only as to the Announce Clause.  534 U.S. 1054, 1054 (2001).  Upon 
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In Part II, I will sketch out a general framework for thinking about 
the regulation of election campaigns and, more specifically, of judicial 
election campaigns.  I will indicate that the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly upheld campaign regulations, even those that trench on the 
free speech rights of candidates and their supporters, when those 
regulations promote other important values, such as improving the 
quality of the electoral process or enhancing the integrity of govern-
ment.  I will suggest that the special nature of the judicial function can 
justify restrictions on campaign conduct that would not be constitu-
tional in the nonjudicial setting. 
In Part III, I consider some of the specific campaign conduct can-
ons that have been subject to legal challenge in recent years.  I will ar-
gue that restrictions on campaign “pledges or promises” and “com-
mitments” are constitutional, even though comparable restrictions on 
legislative and executive candidates would be unconstitutional.  To be 
sure, some current versions of these restrictions are subject to chal-
lenge as vague or overly broad.  But the basic idea that judicial candi-
dates can be precluded from making statements that indicate that 
they have prejudged cases or issues that are likely to come before 
them as judges is sound. 
The canon dealing with misrepresentations presents a different 
question.  It is difficult to see what in the nature of judging requires 
judges to be held to a higher standard of honesty than other public 
officials.  But it may be that properly defined restrictions on misrepre-
sentations would be constitutional with respect to candidates for any 
elected office, even if in practice such restrictions are aimed primarily 
at judicial candidates. 
holding that the Minnesota Announce Clause violated the First Amendment, the Su-
preme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to respondents and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.  White, 536 U.S. at 788.  On remand, a divided Eighth 
Circuit panel adhered to the appellate court’s prior position upholding the anti-
personal solicitation canon, 361 F.3d 1035, 1048-49 (8th Cir. 2004), but reversed the 
summary judgment for the defendants and remanded for trial on the challenge to the 
partisan activity restrictions, id. at 1043-48.  The dissenter would have entered summary 
judgment for the plaintiffs on both issues.  Id. at 1049.  The panel’s treatment of the 
personal solicitation issue is discussed at infra text accompanying note 180, and its con-
sideration of the restrictions on partisan political activities is considered at infra text 
accompanying notes 207-11.  Two months after the panel decision, the Eighth Circuit 
voted to grant rehearing en banc and to vacate the panel’s opinion and judgment.  
Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
10232, at *4 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004).  As of the printing of this Article, oral argument 
of the rehearing en banc was scheduled for October 20, 2004.  Notice to All Counsel:  October 
18-24, 2004, United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit at 4, at http:// 
www.ca8.uscourts.gov/webcal/print/oct04stp.pdf (rev. Oct. 1, 2004). 
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Restrictions on candidates’ personal solicitation of campaign con-
tributions and partisan political activity also ought to be treated as 
constitutional.  These restrictions advance the compelling public in-
terest in judicial impartiality and independence.  Moreover, these 
rules affect only campaign behavior.  They do not affect the content 
of candidates’ campaign statements and, thus, cut less deeply into the 
candidates’ freedom of expression while also avoiding the reduction 
in voter information that might result from restrictions on campaign 
statements.  As a result, these restrictions ought to be upheld as con-
stitutional, White notwithstanding. 
Finally, even if these canons are constitutional, the question re-
mains whether they are likely to be effective in reconciling the com-
peting goals of informed voter decision making, vigorous competition, 
and judicial impartiality that together frame the debate over the regu-
lation of judicial election campaigns.  My sense is that the benefits of 
the canons are modest at best.  Other forces, including the growing 
costs of judicial election campaigns and the increasing involvement of 
interest groups in judicial elections,23 are likely to swamp the effects of 
continued enforcement of the canons.  As I will discuss in the Conclu-
sion, the quality of judicial elections and the impartiality of judicial 
decision making might be better advanced through other devices, par-
ticularly public funding of judicial elections and the exclusion of 
judges from cases where their campaign statements indicate they have 
prejudged the outcome. 
I.  ALL ELECTIONS ARE NOT ALIKE:  THE VARIATION IN ELECTION RULES 
ACCORDING TO THE PURPOSE OF THE ELECTION 
One strand in the debate over judicial campaign rules essentially 
relies on the argument that, although there is no requirement that 
judges be elected, when a state “opt[s] for an elected judiciary,”24 the 
state thereby also agrees to submit to a package of constitutional con-
straints that apply to all elections.  But there is a surprising degree of 
variability in the constitutional rules that govern elections.  On more 
than one occasion, the Supreme Court has distinguished among elec-
23 See generally DEBORAH GOLDBERG & SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, THE NEW POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2002:  HOW THE THREAT TO FAIR AND IMPARTIAL COURTS SPREAD 
TO MORE STATES IN 2002 (2004) (arguing that special interest groups pressure state 
supreme court candidates to sacrifice impartiality once elected), available at 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/justiceatst
ake_20040506/b_new_politics_report.pdf (last accessed Oct. 7, 2004). 
24 White, 536 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). 
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tions for different types of public offices, between elections for office 
and elections concerning ballot propositions, and even among differ-
ent types of ballot issues.  These distinctions affect who may vote, how 
votes may be weighted, and how campaign finances may be regulated.  
As a result, the standard constitutional requirements of universal suf-
frage and equally weighted votes do not apply to all elections.  Simi-
larly, the constitutionality of campaign contribution restrictions turns 
on the nature of the election.  Rather than requiring a uniform set of 
election rules, the Court has held that requirements may vary in light 
of the government actions affected by the election, the differential 
impact of the election on different constituencies, and the differences 
in the dangers posed by the regulated behavior on the public offices 
or issues determined by the election. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has exempted certain elections from 
the requirements of universal suffrage and one person, one vote.  In 
the special district cases involving referenda in or the election of 
members to the boards of directors of highly specialized government 
bodies engaged in irrigation, water storage, and flood control, the 
Court held that due to the special limited purposes of the districts and 
the disproportionate impact of the districts’ activities on a discrete 
constituency—landowners—the franchise could be limited to land-
owners, and, indeed, votes could be allocated according to assessed 
valuation.25  The Court determined that the districts engaged in a very 
limited range of activities and did not exercise core governmental 
powers like taxation, lawmaking, or the provision of basic public ser-
vices.26  Moreover, the Court found that landowners bore financial re-
sponsibility for the districts’ expenses and bond obligations, and were 
the primary focus of the districts’ activities.  Indeed, the states had es-
tablished these districts for the benefit of the landowners.  As a result, 
the Court concluded that the districts were not subject to the rules of 
universal suffrage and equally weighted voting applicable to most fed-
eral, state, and local elections.  The Court held that states could limit 
the electoral constituency and allocate voting power in accordance 
with the special purposes of the districts.  The lower federal courts 
25 See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981) (“[T]he State could rationally 
limit the vote to landowners.”); Associated Enters. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement 
Dist., 410 U.S. 743, 745 (1973) (holding that since landowners are the ones primarily 
burdened and benefited by the watershed development, votes on the project can be 
allocated accordingly); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 
U.S. 719, 730-31 (1973) (ruling that non-landowning residents may be excluded from 
the franchise regarding the watershed district). 
26 Ball, 451 U.S. at 366. 
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have extended the special district exception to districts whose focuses 
include the core functions of government not found in the special dis-
trict cases—including education, street maintenance, and sanitation—
when the districts in question have limited powers, may be character-
ized as advisory or supplemental, and do not wield significant govern-
ing authority.27
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that certain bond issue 
elections need not be subject to the rule of equal voting power.  In 
Gordon v. Lance,28 the Court upheld a West Virginia constitutional pro-
vision that conditioned the approval of state and local bond issues on 
the affirmative votes of 60% of the voters in a referendum.29  Such a 
rule permits a minority of voters to block a majority-approved bond 
issue and, thus, gives those minority voters voting power dispropor-
tionate to their numbers.30  The Supreme Court, however, found that, 
due in part to the nature of the issue, the state could condition ap-
proval of the bond issue on an electoral supermajority:  “It must be 
remembered that in voting to issue bonds voters are committing, in 
part, the credit of infants and of generations yet unborn, and some re-
striction on such commitment is not an unreasonable demand.”31
To be sure, Gordon relied on a second consideration:  that West 
Virginia’s supermajority requirement did not privilege or burden any 
specific group or issue.  Any minority greater than 40% of the vote 
could block any majority less than 60% on any bond issue.32  But the 
importance of that consideration may have been reduced—and the 
significance of the purpose of the election increased—a few years later 
by Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, 
Inc.33  In this case, the Court upheld a provision of the New York Con-
stitution that conditioned the reorganization of county government 
on approval, in a referendum, of concurrent majorities of city and 
27 See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 93-94 (2d Cir. 
1998) (affirming finding that a business improvement district is a special, limited-
purpose entity that is not subject to the requirement of one person, one vote); Pittman 
v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that Chicago 
school councils are special-purpose governmental bodies that do not need to adhere to 
the one person, one vote principle). 
28 403 U.S. 1 (1971). 
29 Id. at 7-8. 
30 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals so found and invalidated the state 
constitutional provision.  Lance v. Bd. of Educ., 170 S.E.2d 783, 791 (W. Va. 1969). 
31 Gordon, 403 U.S. at 6. 
32 Id. at 4-5. 
33 430 U.S. 259 (1977). 
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non-city voters within a county.  As a result, a narrow majority of non-
city voters in Niagara County was able to block a county government 
reorganization favored by both the city voters and an aggregate major-
ity of all of Niagara’s voters.34  Unlike the voting rule in Gordon, the 
New York requirement did provide special recognition to a distinct 
constituency within the county, and the concurrent majority require-
ment was limited to a particular issue.  The Supreme Court, however, 
found that this was constitutional because of the nature of the ques-
tion put to the voters.  The referendum was a “single-shot” vote which 
would transform county government, change the powers of county 
subunits, and alter the relationships between subunits and the 
county.35  Such a change could have different consequences for the 
urban and nonurban parts of the county.  Looking to the special-
district cases, the Court found that “the different county constituent 
units” would be “directly and differentially affected by the restructur-
ing of county government”36 and, thus, the state could require the 
separate consent of each of the affected groups—even though, under 
Avery v. Midland County,37 it would have been unconstitutional to give 
non-city voters a comparably disproportionate power in the ongoing 
governance of the county. 
The constitutionality of campaign finance practices as well as vot-
ing rules may vary according to the nature of the election.  Although 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld limitations on the dollar 
amounts that may be contributed to candidates, political parties, and 
political committees in connection with elections for office, the Court 
has held that it is unconstitutional to limit the amount of money that 
may be contributed to a political committee that supports or opposes 
a ballot proposition.38  Contributions to candidates, and to parties and 
committees that contribute to or otherwise support candidates for of-
fice, raise the dangers of the corruption or the appearance of corrup-
tion of officeholders.  Due to their dependence on donations for their 
campaigns, officeholders may be “too compliant with the wishes of 
large contributors.”39  Moreover, even the appearance of improper in-
fluence resulting from large contributions to candidates for elective 
34 Id. at 262. 
35 Id. at 266. 
36 Id. at 272. 
37 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
38 Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 
454 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1981). 
39 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
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office could undermine confidence in the system of representative 
government to a disastrous extent.40  But “‘[r]eferenda are held on is-
sues, not candidates for public office.  The risk of corruption per-
ceived in cases involving candidate elections simply is not present in a 
popular vote on a public issue.’”41  As a result, the prevention of cor-
ruption could not justify limiting contributions to committees that 
spend money in ballot proposition elections.  Due to the differences 
in the nature of candidate and ballot proposition elections and in the 
implications of campaign finance practices for government, the First 
Amendment permits the limitation of contributions in candidate elec-
tions but not in ballot proposition elections.42
Of course, the notion that different constitutional rules apply to 
different types of elections is hardly news in the context of judicial 
elections.  Three decades ago in Wells v. Edwards the Supreme Court 
upheld without opinion a lower court finding that judicial elections 
are not subject to one person, one vote.43  The lower court predicated 
its decision on what it saw as the distinctive nature of the judicial of-
fice, determining that judges “‘are not representatives in the same 
sense as are legislators . . . .’ Thus, the rationale behind the one-man, 
one-vote principle, which evolved out of efforts to preserve a truly rep-
resentative form of government, is simply not relevant to the makeup 
of the judiciary.”44  To be sure, Wells has arguably been undermined by 
the Court’s subsequent decision in Chisom v. Roemer,45 which held that 
the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections.  Chisom interpreted 
the provision of section 2 of the Act, which refers to the opportunity 
of citizens protected by the Act “to participate in the political process 
40 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam). 
41 Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 298 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (citations omitted)). 
42 The Court has drawn a similar distinction with respect to the regulation of 
campaign expenditures by corporations—corporate spending in ballot proposition 
elections is constitutionally protected.  First Nat’l Bank, 435 U.S. at 795.  But the expen-
diture of corporate treasury funds to promote or oppose the election of a candidate 
may be barred.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619, 666-68 (2003); Austin v. 
Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990). 
43 Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973), aff’g 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972). 
44 Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 455 (quoting Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 
(N.D. Ga. 1964) (per curiam)). 
45 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991); see also Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney Gen., 501 
U.S. 419, 421 (1991) (upholding application of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to 
elections for trial judges); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652 (1991) (reviewing appli-
cation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to judicial elections). 
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and to elect representatives of their choice,”46 to include the election of 
judges.  But Chisom based its decision on the intent of Congress, de-
nied that the case presented a constitutional claim, and distinguished 
and thereby preserved Wells47—even though Chisom’s recognition that 
courts “engage in policymaking at some level”48 and that the concept 
of representativeness is implicated by a state’s decision to select its 
judges by popular election49 is plainly in tension with the reasoning 
that animated Wells. 
In short, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the 
constitutional norms governing elections—such as the scope of suf-
frage, the allocation of voting power, and the power to restrict cam-
paign finance practices—may vary according to the subject of the elec-
tion, including the nature of the issue put before the voters or the 
powers and responsibilities of the office to be filled.  This has affected 
both judicial elections and, as the campaign contribution cases indi-
cate, the rules governing the conduct of election campaigns.  Requir-
ing that a judicial office be filled by election does not automatically 
trigger a uniform set of constitutional restrictions and requirements 
dealing with elections, because no such uniform set exists. 
Of course, saying that the constitutional rules that govern elec-
tions may vary in light of the issue resolved or the office filled by the 
election merely opens the door to the consideration of the constitu-
tionality of judicial campaign conduct codes; it does not assume that 
the more restrictive rules are constitutional.  Much turns on the na-
ture of the judicial function and how it differs from legislative and ex-
ecutive offices, as well as on how well the restrictive rules reflect those 
differences.  As the tension between the holdings in Wells and Chisom 
indicate, the nature of the judicial function,50 the extent to which 
46 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000) (emphasis added). 
47 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 402-03. 
48 Id. at 399 n.27. 
49 See id. at 401 (“When each of several members of a court must be a resident of a 
separate district, and must be elected by the voters of that district, it seems both rea-
sonable and realistic to characterize the winners as representatives of that district.”). 
50 This question has come up not just in the context of judicial elections but also 
with respect to appointed judges.  In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), the Court 
found that appointed state judges fell within the statutory exemption from the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act for “appointees ‘on the policymaking level,’” not-
ing then-Governor Ashcroft’s contention that, in Missouri, judges exercise policymak-
ing responsibilities, declining to find that judges are “policymakers in the same sense 
as the executive or legislature,” but concluding that it was sufficient for the statutory 
exemption that an appointed judge “is in a position requiring the exercise of discre-
tion concerning issues of public importance.”  Id. at 466-67. 
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elected judges ought to be considered representatives of the voters 
who elect them, and the very meaning of representation in the judi-
cial context perplexed and divided the Court in both the equal pro-
tection and voting rights settings.51  It is not surprising that the appli-
cation of the First Amendment to these codes is difficult as well. 
II.  THE REGULATION OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 
A.  General Considerations 
Any restriction on the speech or conduct of election campaign 
participants implicates at least three interrelated values:  (i) the ex-
pressive and participatory rights of candidates, their supporters, and 
other campaign participants; (ii) the interests of voters in obtaining 
sufficient information to enable them to make an intelligent choice 
on election day; and (iii) the systemic interest in competitive elec-
tions. 
Elections are our central form of collective political decision mak-
ing and, thus, they are our most important mechanism for securing 
democratically accountable government.  The very legitimacy of our 
system of elections requires that candidates be able to participate in 
the electoral process and to make their cases to the voters.  A free 
election assumes that candidates are free not simply to place their 
names on the ballot but to contest the election vigorously.  A vigorous 
contest includes the freedom to communicate with the voters to at-
tempt to persuade them to cast their ballots for a particular candidate. 
The legitimacy of the election also turns on the ability of voters to 
receive the information they need in order to cast informed votes.  
This is not simply a matter of enabling each voter to make a choice 
consistent with her interests or beliefs.  Citizens as voters are making 
choices that bind the polity as a whole and set the course of official 
decision making for the term of the elected official.  There is, thus, a 
collective interest in increasing the amount of relevant information 
51 Both Wells and Chisom were 6-3 decisions.  Justices White and Marshall, who dis-
sented in Wells, were in the majority in Chisom.  Then-Justice Rehnquist, who was in the 
majority in Wells, dissented in Chisom.  The only member of the Court in the majority 
in both cases was Justice Blackmun.  Strikingly, in light of his role as author of the ma-
jority opinion in White, Justice Scalia also authored the dissent in Chisom, observing that 
“representative” means not just one who is “elected by the people, but who also, at a 
minimum, acts on behalf of the people.  Judges do that in a sense—but not in the ordi-
nary sense. . . . [W]e do not ordinarily conceive of judges as representatives [in that 
sense].”  Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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available to the voters in the hope of improving the quality of voter 
decision making. 
Elections may also be seen as a key way for voters to check the 
government and to make it accountable to them.  The opportunity to 
deny reelection to incumbents, and the possibility that in any given 
election the people may exercise their authority to vote out current 
officeholders, is perhaps the ultimate security of popular control over  
government.  This requires competitive elections.  Challengers must 
be able to get on the ballot and make their case to the voters not just 
as a matter of the challengers’ rights but to vindicate the systemic in-
terest in using competitive elections to hold elected officials account-
able. 
Political participation, voter information, and electoral competi-
tiveness may all be burdened by restraints on campaign speech and 
conduct.  Yet, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that candidates 
and other campaign participants may be subject to some form of regu-
lation: 
Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion 
that government must play an active role in structuring elections; “as a 
practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if 
they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than 
chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”
52
Some of these regulations are designed to improve the quality of 
the electoral process.  Contribution disclosure requirements, for ex-
ample, have been upheld, even though they may chill the activities of 
certain donors who would prefer anonymity and thus indirectly hurt 
the campaigns of those candidates the putative donors would have 
supported.  Nevertheless, disclosure has been held to confer impor-
tant benefits on the electoral process because it provides the voters 
with useful information concerning the sources of a candidate’s fi-
nancial support and thus “allows voters to place each candidate in the 
political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the 
basis of party labels and campaign speeches.”53  Similarly, some restric-
tions on the ability of candidates to place their names on the ballot 
have been justified as preventing “ballot overcrowding” and “voter 
confusion.”54  So, too, restrictions on electioneering near polling 
52 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 
724, 730 (1974)). 
53 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam). 
54 Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986). 
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places “serve the States’ compelling interests in preventing voter in-
timidation and election fraud.”55
More commonly, election restrictions are justified in terms of 
their impact on government.  Restrictions on minor parties, write-in 
voters, and sore-loser candidates, who bolt their parties after losing a 
primary and then run as independents, have been upheld as reducing 
factionalism and promoting the two-party system, with the asserted 
benefits of facilitating majority rule and protecting government stabil-
ity.56  So, too, restrictions on campaign contributions have been up-
held, notwithstanding their impact on political expression and asso-
ciation, because such limits alleviate the corruption danger of 
officeholders “too compliant with the wishes of large contributors”57 
and address the appearance of corruption that can demoralize the 
public and undermine belief in government integrity.  In short, the 
values of free speech, voter information, and unfettered competitive-
ness may have to give way when electioneering practices threaten to 
undermine other public values. 
B.  Regulating Judicial Elections 
The special restrictions on judicial candidates plainly limit their 
ability to participate in their own campaigns and to persuade voters to 
vote for them.  By restricting pledges, promises, and other statements 
with respect to disputed political and legal issues, the canons deny 
candidates the opportunity to speak about some of the questions that 
may be most salient to their candidacies.  The ban on misstatements 
may further cause candidates to be cautious about what they say.  The 
ban on personal solicitation may limit the ability of candidates to raise 
the money necessary to fund their campaigns.  The restrictions on 
other political activity may curtail a judicial candidate’s ability to asso-
ciate with her political party and build the party’s support for her 
candidacy. 
These restrictions concomitantly threaten the systemic interest in 
competitive elections.  If candidates cannot speak freely about con-
tested legal issues, work with their parties, and raise money personally, 
their ability to campaign effectively may be undermined.  This is par-
55 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992). 
56 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 379-80 (1997) 
(upholding constitutionality of a Minnesota election regulation that had the effect of 
favoring a two-party system). 
57 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
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ticularly true in judicial elections, which have traditionally been low-
salience events, with low public interest, very low free media coverage, 
and, as a result, low voter turnout.58  These restrictions may make it more 
difficult to get the public interested in judicial campaigns.  This bur-
den weighs particularly heavily on challengers, who are likely to lack 
even the limited name recognition that the incumbents enjoy.  The 
less the candidates can say or do, the less competitive the elections are 
likely to be. 
Candidate speech restrictions also, by definition, limit voter in-
formation.  With the free media providing limited or no coverage to 
judicial elections, voters obtain virtually all their information about 
judicial candidates from the candidates themselves or from other elec-
toral actors, such as special interest organizations that undertake in-
dependent expenditure efforts.  The canons, however, would limit can-
didates to discussing their resumes and personalities and the resumes 
and personalities of their opponents, and would bar them from dis-
cussing the kinds of legal issues that could come before their courts.  
This surely limits the information available to the voters concerning 
how the candidates might address the cases that they are called upon 
to adjudicate.  Moreover, not only would the voters have less informa-
tion, but any information they do obtain concerning candidate views 
of legal issues would likely come from interest groups—which are not 
subject to the judicial canons—rather than the candidates themselves. 
To be sure, some proponents of the judicial canons appear to 
have their doubts about both the value of competitive elections and 
the benefits of informing voters about candidate views concerning le-
gal issues.  Many appear to treat competitive elections as a threat to 
the independence of the judiciary, as judges facing an upcoming re-
election may finding themselves tailoring their decisions in light of 
the electorate’s anticipated reaction.59  So, too, defenders of the can-
ons appear to assume that candidate views about legal issues are not 
actually relevant to the questions of which of two competing candi-
dates should be elected or whether an incumbent judge should be re-
tained.  For some defenders of the canons, educational and profes-
58 See Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000:  Change and Challenge, 
2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 855 (2001) (“Polls over many years show a startling 
voter unawareness of even the names of even the most visible judicial candidates.  Judicial 
races almost never draw press coverage . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
59 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, A Commentary on Public Funds or Publicly Funded Benefits 
and the Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 845, 848 (2001) (arguing that 
judges “are not supposed to be ‘accountable’ for their decisions to public opinion”). 
 
2004] JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CODES 197 
 
sional attainments, experience, character, and temperament, rather than 
views, are the only information that voters should need to make their 
decisions. 
The concern about competition seems antithetical to the very idea 
of having elections.  Indeed, it is inconsistent with anything other than 
life tenure for judges, since even appointed judges who serve for 
terms have to secure the approval of political decision makers if they 
want to continue in office after the conclusion of their terms.  The 
challenge to independence, then, comes not so much from the elec-
tion but from the limited term.60  The real issue is what considerations 
ought to go into the thinking of the appointing officials—or the vot-
ers—in deciding whether to select or retain a judge, which leads di-
rectly to the second question of what information ought those deci-
sion makers to have. 
This requires some consideration of the nature of judging.  If judg-
ing were simply a matter of the mechanical application of precise 
rules to canned facts, then there would be a lot to be said for limiting 
judicial election campaigns to a comparison of educational attain-
ments, professional qualifications, and other evidence of the candi-
dates’ technical skills, and for excluding as extraneous the candidates’ 
views on legal and political issues.  But this description misses much of 
the nature of the judicial function and of the laws that judges inter-
pret and apply.  Judges find disputed facts, apply loosely defined legal 
rules, and shape the development of legal doctrine.61  Their decisions 
are inescapably affected by their own views and beliefs about law and 
public policy.  Information about those views is, thus, deeply relevant 
to the decisions of the appointing, and reappointing, authority, 
whether a governor or the voters.  As the Michigan Supreme Court 
recently observed, a judicial election provides the opportunity for 
“meaningful debate . . . concerning the overall direction of the courts 
and the role of individual judges in contributing to that direction.”62  
60 Cf. Richard L. Hasen, “High Court Wrongly Elected”:  A Public Choice Model of Judg-
ing and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1330-35 (1997) (ar-
guing that length of judicial term is the primary determinant of degree of judicial in-
dependence). 
61 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
535, 542-43 (1999) (demonstrating that where there is not a clear legal rule or judges 
have discretion to pronounce general legal rules, judges’ viewpoints affect their deci-
sions); W. Bradley Wendel, The Ideology of Judging and the First Amendment in Judicial Elec-
tion Campaigns, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 109 (2001) (“Applicable legal principles may be 
plural and conflicting.”). 
62 In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 42 (Mich. 2000). 
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That meaningful debate cannot take place unless judges and judicial 
candidates are free to participate in it. 
With the interests in electoral competition and voter information 
as strong in the judicial setting as in the executive and legislative are-
nas, the issue in considering the constitutionality of judicial campaign 
codes is whether there are aspects of the judicial office that support 
greater regulation of judicial elections than elections for the legisla-
tive and executive branches.  Defenders of the canons point to three 
interrelated concerns:  judicial impartiality, judicial independence, 
and a more amorphous sense that judges must be set “aside from the 
hurly-burly of sometimes unseemly political strife.”63
Judicial impartiality refers to the constitutional imperative that 
judges treat all parties before them fairly and equally and decide cases 
according to the evidence and the law.  Like the statue of blindfolded 
Justice who presides over so many courthouses, judges are supposed to 
do their work while remaining indifferent to the identities of the par-
ties and lawyers before them, without a preference for one side or a 
bias against the other.  As Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard of Indiana 
has argued, the duty of judicial impartiality and the rules protecting it 
“have their foundations in due process.”64
The duty of impartiality distinguishes judges from executives and 
legislators.  Executive and legislative officeholders are free to favor 
one set of interests over another, to make decisions after hearing just 
one side of the argument, and to dig in their heels in support of one 
position.  And certainly executive and legislative candidates are free to 
emphasize their biases, prejudices, and commitments in their cam-
paigns.  As one circuit court has noted, campaign promises “are desir-
able so that voters may make a choice between proposed agendas that 
affect the public.”65  Similar campaign statements by judicial candi-
dates, however, can threaten judicial impartiality if they indicate that 
the candidate has predetermined how she will act on the bench and 
suggest that the judge will not treat all cases and parties evenhand-
edly.  So, too, judicial candidates can make statements that undermine 
the appearance of judicial impartiality and, thus, the public’s confi-
dence in the fairness of the courts. 
63 Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech:  Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1067 (1996); accord Robert F. Bauer, Thoughts on the Democ-
ratic Basis for Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 35 IND. L. REV. 747, 749-51 (2001) 
(discussing the “judge-politician divide”). 
64 Shepard, supra note 63, at 1060. 
65 Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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Judicial independence is linked to impartiality since only a judge 
independent of outside pressures can impartially apply the law to all 
the parties who appear before her.  But independence also implicates 
the separation of powers and the freedom of the courts from the 
other branches of government.  To be sure, separation-of-powers con-
cerns apply to the executive and the legislature as well, and constitu-
tional law has been used to upset even consensual agreements be-
tween those branches.  But independence has been treated as 
particularly important for the courts, as it enables judges to pursue 
their special role in protecting the constitutional rights of minorities 
and vindicating the rule of law even for unpopular parties.66  The ex-
ecutive and legislative branches have to work together in order for 
government to function as a whole.  But the independence of the 
courts from the assertedly more political branches is essential if the 
courts are to apply the rule of law and protect minorities.  As a result, 
although we celebrate the role of political parties in linking up the 
separate houses of a bicameral legislature, the legislature with the ex-
ecutive, and the different levels of our federal system to facilitate more 
effective governance, if the parties were comparably effective in coor-
dinating the actions of the courts with the other branches, the capac-
ity of the courts to carry out their duties could be seriously under-
mined. 
The third argument for the canons looks not so much to the op-
erational separation of the judicial from the political as to the asserted 
distinctiveness of judicial and political behavior.  It reflects the view 
that in order for judges to take their role seriously and apply the law 
impartially, protect rights, and defend minorities, they need to enjoy a 
special degree of public respect—a respect that would be impaired if 
judges campaigned like ordinary politicians.  As one jurist has ob-
served, “[w]e place courts and judges on a higher plateau.”67  This re-
quires that judicial candidates abide by higher standards of civility and 
decorum, as judicial-candidate “mudslinging” poses a “threat to judi-
cial integrity and public confidence in the judiciary.”68
66 See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:  Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726-29 (1995) (warning that an elective judiciary may 
compromise the rights of unpopular minorities). 
67 Shepard, supra note 63, at 1067. 
68 Adam R. Long, Keeping Mud Off the Bench:  The First Amendment and Regulation of 
Candidates’ False or Misleading Statements in Judicial Elections, 51 DUKE L.J. 787, 803 
(2001); see also Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (ruling 
that restrictions on judicial candidate misrepresentations are necessary “so as not to 
damage the actual and perceived integrity” of the judiciary), aff’d mem., 861 F.2d 719 
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This “higher plateau” argument for the special nature of the judi-
ciary is perhaps the weakest of the three, as even some defenders of 
the canons have acknowledged.69  It may be hard to see why judges are 
more demeaned by the “hurly-burly” of campaigning than are guber-
natorial or legislative candidates.  So, too, the provision for judicial 
elections means that state judges, like other elected officials, can 
command respect and legitimacy from their popular mandate and do 
not need to present themselves as above politics.  Moreover, governors 
and legislators, no less than judges, must on occasion make unpopular 
decisions and try to lead rather than follow public opinion if they are 
to pursue the long-term public interest.  Still, there may be something 
to the argument that elected judges need the greater respectability 
that might come from higher-toned campaigns in order to bring off 
the delicate balancing act of reconciling their public accountability 
with their constitutional obligation to the rule of law. 
Ultimately, the argument for the constitutionality of the special 
regulation of judicial elections requires the determination that judg-
ing, although informed by the legal and political viewpoints of the 
judges, requires special protection from the political consequences of 
election campaigns.  To some extent, the question recapitulates the 
ongoing and increasingly intense debate over the factors that ought to 
go into the appointment and confirmation of life-tenured federal 
judges.  Surely, a candidate’s judicial philosophy, views of past cases 
and current legal controversies, and political beliefs are relevant to 
how she will exercise the discretion intrinsic to judging.  Yet, we still 
want judges, as they decide individual cases, to consider only the evi-
dence and the law before them, to give a fair hearing to all the parties, 
and to make decisions independent of precommitments and external 
pressures.  Judging is political, but it still must be undertaken apart 
from politics.  The judicial campaign canons, and the debate over the 
constitutionality of the canons, must walk the very elusive and possibly 
illusory line of permitting judicial candidates to engage vigorously in 
the political and legal debates relevant to their role while barring 
them from undermining the impartiality and independence the 
(6th Cir. 1988); cf. ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 
1990) (“[A] state may require [judicial] candidates to maintain a higher standard of 
conduct than can be expected of candidates in other types of elective contests.”). 
69 See, e.g., Robert M. O’Neil, The Canons in the Courts:  Recent First Amendment Rul-
ings, 35 IND. L. REV. 701, 715 (2002) (referring to “occasional slighting references to a 
nostalgic desire for ‘civility in judicial campaigns’” while contending that the major 
case for the canons is protection of judicial impartiality (quoting In re Chmura, 608 
N.W.2d 31, 40, 43 (Mich. 2000))). 
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courts should display, and the respect judges should receive, if the ju-
dicial system is to provide evenhanded justice, protect constitutional 
rights, and enjoy public confidence. 
In a sense, the battle over the constitutionality of the canons re-
sembles the conflict over the constitutionality of campaign finance re-
form.  In both situations, regulations would restrict the ability of cam-
paign participants to make their views known to the electorate, 
thereby limiting both the campaigners’ rights and the information the 
public needs in order to cast an intelligent vote.  In both situations, 
the regulations are vindicated in terms of the impact of unrestricted 
campaign practices on the interelection performance of government.  
Much as judicial campaign conduct restrictions are justified primarily 
in terms of judicial impartiality and independence, contribution re-
strictions have been justified as preventing corruption and the ap-
pearance of corruption.70  Indeed, judicial partiality and the loss of ju-
dicial independence may be said to constitute corruption of the 
judicial function. 
As in the campaign finance setting, the meaning of judicial impar-
tiality, like the meaning of corruption, has proven to be difficult to de-
termine.  The Supreme Court has defined corruption as the situation 
that results when elected officials are “too compliant with the wishes 
of large contributors.”71  Yet, surely the willingness of elected officials 
to respond to the requests of their supporters is often appropriate and 
may indeed be politically desirable.  As Justice Kennedy, dissenting in 
part in the recent McConnell decision, observed, “democracy is prem-
ised on responsiveness.”72  Basing the constitutionality of campaign fi-
nance regulation on the prevention of corruption requires a theory 
that can “distinguish good political responsiveness from bad.”73  In 
McConnell, the Supreme Court found that the “special access”74 or 
“preferential access”75 that large donors obtain in exchange for their 
contributions is the distinctive “bad responsiveness”76 that can justify 
campaign finance regulation.  Indeed, the Court was surprisingly def-
70 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that anticor-
ruption concerns justify restrictions on the size of campaign contributions). 
71 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
72 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 748 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 686. 
75 Id. at 668. 
76 Id. at 748. (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). 
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erential to Congress’s findings concerning the kind of campaign fi-
nance practices that raise the danger of special access for donors.77
It remains to be seen if, after White, there is a theory, and con-
comitant campaign speech and conduct restrictions, that can “distin-
guish good political responsiveness from bad”78 in the judicial setting, 
too.  But the campaign finance cases in general and McConnell in par-
ticular provide strong support for the constitutionality of restrictions 
on judicial campaign practices that can be seen as threatening to cor-
rupt the judicial function or as creating the appearance that the judi-
cial function has been corrupted. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CANONS AFTER REPUBLICAN  
PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE  
A.  White and the Announce Clause 
White considered and invalidated the Minnesota Code of Judicial 
Conduct’s Announce Clause, which stated that a judicial candidate 
should not “announce his or her views on disputed legal or political 
issues.”79  Promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1974, the 
Announce Clause was based squarely on Canon 7B of the Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 
1972.  The ABA has profoundly shaped the development and content 
of state judicial campaign regulation.  The ABA first sought to address 
judicial campaign behavior in 1924 when it adopted its Canons of Ju-
dicial Ethics.  Canon 30 provided, inter alia, that a judicial candidate 
“should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on disputed 
issues to secure class support.” 80  Although “[f]orty-three states adopted 
some version of the 1924 Canons,”81 the 1924 Canons were hortatory 
and “not intended to be a basis for disciplinary action.”82  In 1972 the 
77 See Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Fi-
nance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 165-67 (2004) (explaining that the Court relied pri-
marily on general assertions about the pervasive effects of contributions on the politi-
cal process rather than on evidence of the impact of particular donations on specific 
government actions). 
78 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 748 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). 
79 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002) (quoting 
MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2000)). 
80 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924). 
81 Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the Solution to Harmful Speech?  Judicial 
Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 262, 266 (2003). 
82 Rick A. Johnson, Judicial Campaign Speech in Kentucky After Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 347, 353 (2003). 
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ABA promulgated the Code of Judicial Conduct, which included the 
language subsequently adopted by Minnesota.83  With minor varia-
tions, the 1972 Code was adopted by some forty-seven states.84
Even prior to the White decision, the Announce Clause was on 
shaky constitutional ground.  When the ABA revised the Model Code 
in 1990, it dropped the Announce Clause.  The Note accompanying 
the legislative draft explained that the ABA’s Committee on Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility believed the Announce Clause was “an 
overly broad restriction on speech.”85  The Announce Clause was re-
placed by language prohibiting a candidate from making “statements 
that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, 
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court.”86  The 
ABA’s concern about the overly broad nature of the Announce Clause 
was echoed in a series of court decisions during the early 1990s nar-
rowing or invalidating the Announce Clause in states that had not 
modified their canons.87  By the time of White, due to constitutional 
challenges and canon revisions, only nine state canons continued to 
retain the Announce Clause, and several of these were narrower, by 
their terms or as a result of judicial interpretation, than the Clause at 
issue in White.88
As the Court noted, one of the primary arguments asserted in de-
fense of the Announce Clause was that it “preserv[ed] the impartiality 
83 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972). 
84 Moerke, supra note 81, at 267. 
85 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AS SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE 
1990 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE ABA app. C, at 72 (1990). 
86 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). 
87 See, e.g., Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(finding Illinois’ Announce Clause unconstitutionally overbroad); Beshear v. Butt, 863 
F. Supp. 913, 918 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (finding Arkansas Announce Clause unconstitu-
tionally overbroad); ACLU of Fla. v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1099 (N.D. Fla. 1990) 
(concluding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed in their constitutional challenge to 
Florida’s Announce Clause); J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Ky. 1991) (find-
ing Kentucky’s Announce Clause unconstitutionally overbroad); cf. Stretton v. Disci-
plinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991) (subjecting Pennsylvania’s Announce 
Clause to narrowing interpretation and upholding it as narrowed).  Stretton narrowed 
the Announce Clause by holding that it applied only to issues “likely” to come before 
the court.  The Seventh Circuit, in Buckley, treated that as an illusory limitation, reason-
ing that almost any issue could come before a court.  997 F.2d at 229-30; see also Berger 
v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (interpreting Ohio’s An-
nounce Clause as not applying to the announcement of views concerning questions of 
judicial administration), aff’d mem., 861 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1988). 
88 Moerke, supra note 81, at 267-68 & n.54. 
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of the state judiciary.”89  Justice Scalia’s opinion parsed the concept of 
impartiality, finding that it could be used in any of three possible 
senses:  (i) the avoidance of bias for or against a specific party in a ju-
dicial proceeding; (ii) the “lack of preconception in favor of or 
against a particular legal view”; or (iii) open-mindedness, in the sense 
of being “open to persuasion.”90
The Court appeared to accept the compelling nature of the first 
sense of impartiality—avoiding bias against a party—but concluded 
that the Announce Clause did little to advance that interest since the 
Clause referred only to statements about legal issues, not parties.91  
Moreover, the Announce Clause was far broader than an anti-party-
bias rule, and hence not narrowly tailored to serve the interest in pre-
venting bias against parties.92
The Court sharply rejected the second definition of impartiality.  
Although at one point the Court suggested there is a public interest in 
preventing judicial preconceptions but that such interest is not consti-
tutionally compelling,93 the thrust of Justice Scalia’s opinion was to 
deny any value to this version of impartiality at all.  In the Court’s 
view, not only do most judges come to the bench with at least some 
preconceptions about the law, so that the goal of the Announce 
Clause is impossible to attain, but avoiding judicial preconceptions 
would not even be desirable.  As Justice Scalia observed, quoting an 
earlier statement of then-Justice Rehnquist, “[p]roof that a Justice’s 
mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the 
area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of quali-
fication, not lack of bias.”94
The Court then turned to impartiality-as-open-mindedness: 
This quality in a judge demands, not that he have no preconceptions on 
legal issues, but that he be willing to consider views that oppose his pre-
89 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002).  The Court noted 
that the Eighth Circuit had also referred to a compelling government interest in an 
independent judiciary but found that both the lower court and respondents had used 
the concepts of impartiality and independence interchangeably.  Id. at 775 n.6.  As a 
result, the Court did not separately consider whether the interest in judicial independ-
ence was compelling or whether the Announce Clause was narrowly tailored to pro-
mote that interest. 
90 Id. at 775-78. 
91 Id. at 776. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 777. 
94 Id. at 778 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., 
mem.)). 
 
2004] JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CODES 205 
 
conceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a 
pending case.  This sort of impartiality seeks to guarantee each litigant, 
not an equal chance to win the legal points in the case, but at least some 
chance of doing so.
95
But the Court declined to determine whether impartiality-as-open-
mindedness is a compelling state interest, “since we do not believe the 
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the announce clause for that pur-
pose.”96  Moreover, the Court concluded that by regulating only 
statements in election campaigns the Announce Clause was fatally un-
der-inclusive.  Even if, as respondents contended, campaign state-
ments about disputed legal and political issues could create undue 
pressure for judges to adhere to certain positions in subsequent cases, 
“statements in election campaigns are such an infinitesimal portion of 
the public commitments to legal positions that judges (or judges-to-
be) undertake” that it was “implausible” to believe that an Announce 
Clause aimed solely at campaign statements could alleviate those pres-
sures.97  Judges and candidates could have aired their views in pub-
lished opinions, books, speeches, or in the course of other political 
activities before they went on the bench.98  “As a means of pursuing 
the objective of open-mindedness that respondents now articulate, the 
announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in 
that purpose a challenge to the credulous.”99
The Court was right to invalidate the Announce Clause.  As even 
the ABA had previously recognized, the Clause cut deeply into judicial 
election speech, denying voters a wide range of information relevant 
to their electoral decisions.  The Clause burdened challengers, who, 
in low-salience judicial elections, have a special need to get their views 
on disputed legal and political issues to the voters so that there can be 
some voter interest in the election and some basis for evaluating the 
differences between a challenger and the incumbent.  Yet, the Clause 
could also be unfair to an incumbent, who, if attacked for an unpopu-
lar ruling, might be barred by the Clause from defending the legal 
reasoning that required the decision.  Most importantly, the An-
nounce Clause has the paradoxical effect of taking the discussion of 
significant election-related issues away from the candidates and hand-
ing it over to the high-spending interest groups who have been so 
95 Id. at 778. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 779. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 780. 
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criticized for politicizing, if not debasing, judicial election cam-
paigns.100  After all, the canons regulate only incumbent judges and 
candidates for judicial office; they do not and cannot regulate the 
television advertising of the business groups, labor unions, trial law-
yers, and other interest groups who loom so large in contemporary 
judicial elections.  Under the Announce Clause, political and legal is-
sues would surely be discussed during judicial election campaigns, but 
the candidates—and only the candidates—would be muzzled.101
With respect to the role of the Announce Clause in protecting ju-
dicial impartiality, the Court was correct in its conclusion that the 
Clause was poorly aimed at the prevention of bias against parties and, 
more importantly, that impartiality cannot be equated with an ab-
sence of preconceptions about legal issues.  Surely, any candidate with 
significant experience in law has some preconceptions about legal is-
sues.  All the Announce Clause could do was preclude candidates 
from telling the electorate about their preconceptions.  And if the ar-
ticulation of views concerning legal issues is treated as an absence of 
impartiality, many veteran judges with consistent jurisprudential ap-
proaches in certain types of cases would be barred from hearing those 
cases in the future. 
The Court’s treatment of the argument of impartiality-as-open-
mindedness, however, had two troubling features that raise questions 
for some of the other canons dealing with judicial campaign activity.  
First, the Court declined to find—or to reject—that the preservation 
of impartiality-as-open-mindedness is a compelling state interest.  The 
Court declined to “pursue that inquiry” since it concluded that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had not adopted the Announce Clause for 
that purpose.102  It is not clear why the purpose of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court, as opposed to the text and effect of the Clause, was cru-
cial.  Plainly the Court considered the Clause to be too loosely tailored 
to be justified by the interest in protecting open-mindedness.  Indeed, 
it is far from clear why a statement by a judge-as-candidate about her 
general views on a legal issue would be subsequently treated by the 
candidate-as-judge as a precommitment.  Yet, the protection of impar-
100 On the large and growing role of interest groups in judicial elections, see gen-
erally Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1391 (2001) (discussing the increasingly sophisticated techniques used by interest 
groups to influence judicial politics). 
101 But cf. GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 23, at 23-25 (contending that White 
emboldened interest groups to press candidates for statements of their positions on 
issues). 
102 White, 536 U.S. at 778. 
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tiality-as-open-mindedness could be a compelling interest even though 
the Announce Clause was inadequately tailored to promoting that 
goal.103  Given that the prevention of precommitments is the central 
goal animating the Pledge or Promise and the Commit or Appear to 
Commit Clauses, it would have been useful for the Court to have re-
solved the question of whether there is a compelling governmental in-
terest in preventing prejudgments.  Perhaps the Court’s careful hedg-
ing was simply an instance of the general norm of avoiding 
unnecessary constitutional adjudication.  On the other hand, given 
the inevitability of challenges to those other clauses, the Court’s re-
fusal to support the essential premises of those clauses suggests that 
they may be in trouble. 
Second, the Court’s conclusion that the Announce Clause was 
“woefully underinclusive” because it was limited only to statements 
made during election campaigns104 erred in missing the special signifi-
cance of campaign statements.  Such statements differ by their timing, 
their targeting, their mode of dissemination, and their precise content 
from other statements made by judges and candidates about legal is-
sues.  “[C]ampaign speech, more than other political speech, is in-
strumental in character, molded tactically to accomplish political 
goals, such as building or sustaining a voting majority . . . . There is a 
reason why politicians employ speechwriters and prepare with agoniz-
ing care for debates and public appearances . . . .”105  Moreover, not 
only is campaign speech aimed especially at the voters to influence 
their decisions, it is far more likely to be heard and considered by the 
voters than statements in a candidate’s books, memoranda, or even 
judicial opinions.  Indeed, shortly after White, the Court in McConnell 
upheld the provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA) that provide for restrictive regulation of “electioneering 
communications” defined as, inter alia, communications concerning 
candidates made within sixty days before a general election or thirty 
103 In August 2003, the ABA amended the “terminology” section of the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct to adopt a definition of “impartiality” that includes both “ab-
sence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of par-
ties”—that is, White’s first definition—and “maintaining an open mind in considering 
issues that may come before the judge,” which is the third, and judicially undeter-
mined, definition of impartiality discussed in White.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT Terminology (amended Aug. 2003). 
104 White, 536 U.S. at 779-80. 
105 Bauer, supra note 63, at 750. 
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days before a primary election.106  The Court’s jurisprudence, as well 
as political common sense, supports the conclusion that campaign 
statements are different from other political speech and may be regu-
lated accordingly.107
The logic that restrictions aimed only at campaign statements are 
underinclusive could doom all canons restricting campaign state-
ments.  A ban on only campaign promises or commitments is arguably 
as under-inclusive as restrictions on the campaign-period announce-
ment of political views, and this form of underinclusiveness cannot be 
easily corrected, since a general ban on promises and commitments in 
published statements would surely be unconstitutional.  To be sure, the 
Court left open the possibility that a restriction on campaign promises 
might not be underinclusive.  But the Court said no more than that it 
is “plausible” that campaign commitments might be treated by judges 
as limiting their discretion.108  This provides an uncertain basis for limit-
ing the scope of the Court’s ruling to the Announce Clause. 
White dealt only with Minnesota’s Announce Clause,109 but effectively 
rendered the comparable provisions in other state judicial conduct 
codes unenforceable.  The Missouri Supreme Court so concluded when 
it dropped its Announce Clause one month after White was decided,110 
and a federal district court invalidated the Texas Announce Clause 
106 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 686-89 (2003).  Similarly, in rejecting consti-
tutional challenges to BCRA’s political party soft money restrictions, McConnell addi-
tionally upheld the statute’s definition of state and local political party “federal elec-
tion activity,” which also contains a temporal component:  the treatment of voter 
registration activity during the 120 days preceding a regularly scheduled federal elec-
tion as “federal election activity.”  Id. at 671-75. 
107 See also Dennis F. Thompson, Election Time:  Normative Implications of Temporal 
Properties of the Electoral Process in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 51, 61 (2004) 
(arguing that campaign speech differs from other political speech and may be more 
strictly regulated). 
108 White, 536 U.S. at 780. 
109 Technically, all the White Court did was reverse the lower court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendants and remand to the Eighth Circuit for fur-
ther consideration.  Id. at 788.  The Eighth Circuit subsequently remanded the case to 
the district court with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs on their motion 
for summary judgment on the Announce Clause issue, declaring Minnesota’s An-
nounce Clause invalid.  361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated and reh’g, en banc, granted 
sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10232, at *4 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004). 
110 Order Enforcing Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c) Campaign Conduct (Mo. July 18, 
2002) (en banc), available at http://www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf/0/ 
f1c626db4da8b14086256bfa0073b302? (last accessed Oct. 7, 2004). 
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one month after that.111  The fate of the other canons restricting judi-
cial campaign speech, however, is far less clear. 
B.  The Pledges or Promises Clause 
Nearly all states that conduct judicial elections provide that a can-
didate for judicial office “should not make pledges or promises of 
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of 
the duties of the office.”112  Like the Announce Clause, the Pledges or 
Promises Clause grew out of the ABA’s 1972 Code of Judicial Con-
duct.113  But unlike the Announce Clause, it emerged unscathed from 
the 1990 revisions.114  Moreover, even some of the lower courts that 
were troubled by the Announce Clause have either upheld the 
Pledges or Promises Clause or have indicated that they believe a ban 
on campaign pledges and promises concerning conduct in office is 
constitutional.115  And whereas the Announce Clause was rarely invoked 
prior to White—most of the cases dealing with the Announce Clause 
involved facial challenges to its enforceability116—the Pledges or Prom-
ises Clause has in recent years been repeatedly enforced by the 
courts.117  White carefully tiptoed around the Pledges or Promises 
111 Smith v. Phillips, No. CIV.A.A-02CV111JRN, 2002 WL 1870038, at *1 (W.D. 
Tex. Aug. 6, 2002). 
112 Moerke, supra note 81, at 266-67 (quoting CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
7B(1)(c) (1972)). 
113 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972). 
114 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). 
115 See, e.g., Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(observing that the Pledges or Promises Clause is as unconstitutionally overbroad as 
the Announce Clause); J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Ky. 1991) (“[J]udicial 
candidates [cannot] be allowed to make promises or predispositions of cases or issues 
that are likely to come before the courts that might reflect upon a judge’s impartial-
ity.”); see also Order Enforcing Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c) Campaign Conduct (Mo. 
July 18, 2002) (en banc) (stating that the Missouri “pledges or promises” clause “shall 
otherwise remain in full force and effect,” though the order provides that the An-
nounce Clause will no longer be enforced), available at http://www.osca.state.mo.us/ 
sup/index.nsf/0/f1c626db4da8b14086256bfa0073b302? (last accessed Oct. 7, 2004). 
116 See cases cited supra note 87 (presenting a series of cases challenging Announce 
Clauses). 
117 See, e.g., In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 88-89 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (enforcing 
the Pledges or Promises Clause with respect to statements made in a radio interview), 
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 180 (2003); In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 566, 572 (Fla. 2001) 
(per curiam) (enforcing the Pledges or Promises Clause with respect to statements in a 
letter); In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind. 2001) (per curiam) (enforcing the 
Pledges or Promises Clause with respect to statements made as part of a television ad-
vertisement); In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam) (discussing 
the risks of judicial pledges); In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ind. 1997) (per curiam) 
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Clause, although, as previously indicated, its uncertain treatment of 
the definition of impartiality and of the regulation of only campaign 
statements calls this Clause into question, too. 
Another difficulty for the Pledges or Promises Clause comes from 
the interplay of White and Brown v. Hartlage.118  In Brown, the Supreme 
Court held that a Kentucky law prohibiting any candidate for office 
from making a “promise, agree[ment] or . . . contract with any person 
to vote for or support any particular individual, thing or measure, in 
consideration for the vote . . . of that person”119 could not, consistent 
with the First Amendment, be applied to a candidate’s pledge to take 
less than the statutory salary of the office he was seeking.120  The Court 
found that the Constitution protects at least some campaign promises 
because such candidate statements can reinforce the ability of the 
people to control their government:  “Candidate commitments enhance 
the accountability of government officials to the people whom they 
represent, and assist voters in predicting the effect of their vote.”121  
Nor was it a problem that some of the voters might benefit if the can-
didate, upon election, carried out his pledge: 
[O]ur tradition of political pluralism is partly predicated on the expecta-
tion that voters will pursue their individual good through the political 
process . . . . So long as the hoped-for personal benefit is to be achieved 
through the normal processes of government, and not through some 
private arrangement, it has always been, and remains, a reputable basis 
upon which to cast one’s ballot.
122
Brown and White together indicate that not only are restrictions on ju-
dicial candidate speech subject to strict scrutiny, but also that, outside 
the judicial election setting at least, candidates’ pledges and promises 
enjoy constitutional protection. 
But Brown does not establish that a candidate has an unlimited con-
stitutional right to make campaign promises.  The Court noted that 
“some kinds of promises made by a candidate to voters, and some kinds 
of promises elicited by voters from candidates, may be declared illegal 
(enforcing the Pledges or Promises Clause with respect to “campaign materials”); In re 
Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (enforcing the Pledges or Promises 
Clause with respect to statements that appeared in a letter and newspaper article). 
118 456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
119 Id. at 49 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.055 (Michie 1982)). 
120 Id. at 62. 
121 Id. at 55-56. 
122 Id. at 56. 
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without constitutional difficulty.”123  Indeed, some kinds of promises by 
public officials may be treated as inconsistent with the nature of pub-
lic office.  As the Court indicated, in the legislative and executive set-
tings, promises of private benefits to individuals may be treated as 
“corrupt.”124  In the judicial setting, pledges or promises to decide cer-
tain cases or issues a certain way may be treated as inconsistent with 
the nature of the judicial office and, thus, as the judicial equivalent of 
corruption. 
A judge’s commitment to decide a particular case or issue in a 
particular way would violate the duty of the judge to decide cases “in 
accordance with the law and the evidence.”125  Such a precommitment 
is inconsistent with the value of impartiality-as-open-mindedness that 
White alluded to but did not determine.  Although the Supreme Court 
did not squarely so find, surely the protection of impartiality-as-open-
mindedness is a compelling state interest.126  As the New York Court of 
Appeals recently put it, “openmindedness is central to the judicial 
function for it ensures that each litigant appearing in court has a 
genuine—as opposed to illusory—opportunity to be heard.”127  A 
judge may enter a case with prior views about the issues presented, but 
Due Process requires that the judge’s mind must be “open enough to 
allow reasonable consideration of the legal and factual issues pre-
sented.”128  Although preconceptions may be impossible to avoid, 
when preconceptions harden into prejudgments, the judicial function 
itself is subverted. 
Even if the prevention of judicial precommitments is a compelling 
state interest, does the Pledges or Promises Clause advance that end?  
In other words, do campaign pledges and promises raise the danger 
of pre-commitments?  The Fifth Circuit once observed that 
the contours of the judicial function make inappropriate the same kind 
of particularized pledges of conduct in office that are the very stuff of 
campaigns for most non-judicial offices. . . . [T]he candidate for judicial 
office . . . cannot, consistent with the proper exercise of his judicial pow-
123 Id. at 55. 
124 Id. at 58. 
125 In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ind. 1997) (per curiam). 
126 In the aftermath of White, the ABA adopted, and inserted into the Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct, a definition of “impartiality” that includes “maintaining an open 
mind in considering issues that may come before the judge.”  MODEL CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT, Terminology (amended Aug. 2003). 
127 In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam). 
128 Id. 
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ers, bind himself to decide particular cases in order to achieve a given 
programmatic result.
129
But, of course, campaign pledges are not binding or legally enforce-
able.  Critics of the canons note that politicians do not consistently 
treat themselves as committed to their campaign promises once in of-
fice.130  Nevertheless, a campaign promise, as opposed to a less specific 
statement of views, can solidify the candidate’s predisposition into a 
commitment, can impose some moral pressure on the judge to honor 
the campaign pledge when she is presiding over a case or issue pre-
senting the subject of the pledge, and can lead the litigants who ap-
pear before her to “believe that the judge[] will act in a way consistent 
with [her] campaign behavior rather than consistent with due process 
and due course of law.”131  The fact that the pledge is made during a 
campaign means it is more likely that the candidate intends it to be 
taken seriously as a basis for voter decision making.  So, too, making 
the pledge during the campaign makes it more likely that the voters 
will in fact take it seriously and, in a subsequent election, take action if 
the candidate has not lived up to the pledge. 
 Litigants are also more likely to be aware of campaign-period 
pledges and to take them into account in their legal strategies, their 
arguments to the court, and their assessments of the fairness of a 
court’s decision.  Even if such pledges are not always honored, the 
very fact that the pledge is made undercuts the value of judicial impar-
tiality and the appearance of impartiality.  By making such a pledge or 
promise, the judicial candidate is telling the voters that, once on the 
bench, she will feel free to make decisions in cases that she hears 
based on her campaign statements, rather than the evidence before 
her, the arguments of the parties, or the legal rules applicable to the 
case at hand.  This is in tension with the judicial oath of office, “has 
the additional deleterious effect of miseducating voters about the role 
129 Morial v. Judiciary Comm’n, 565 F.2d 295, 305 (5th Cir. 1977). 
130 See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 61, at 98 (“[T]he experience with political candi-
dates for other offices does not reveal a strong tendency of candidates to stick to their 
campaign positions.”); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candi-
dates Are Unconstitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 744 (2002) (“A judge who is trying, con-
sciously or unconsciously, to please the voters will take the politically popular ap-
proach, whether or not it was expressed previously.”). 
131 In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam); see also Buckley v. Ill. 
Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A candidate] would be under 
pressure to honor [a pre-commitment] if he won . . . and such a case later came before 
him.  This commitment . . . would hamper the judge’s ability to make an impartial de-
cision and would undermine the credibility of his decision to the losing litigant and to 
the community.”). 
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of the judiciary,”132 and can foster a public climate in which judicial 
impartiality itself is devalued.133
Campaign pledges and promises, thus, at the very least threaten 
the appearance of judicial impartiality in much the same way that the 
Supreme Court has found that large campaign contributions create 
the appearance of corruption.134  Much as large donations create a 
reasonable fear that public officials will place private benefits over the 
public interest in making decisions, campaign pledges and promises 
create a reasonable fear that the judge will not make decisions based 
on the facts of the case, the evidence before her, and the rule of law.  
Like large contributions, judicial campaign promises undermine the 
legitimacy of government.  Much as government can act to limit the 
undue influence and the appearance of undue influence of large con-
tributions on elected representatives, so, too, government can act to 
protect public confidence that judges will properly discharge their ju-
dicial function.135
The Pledges or Promises Clause is properly tailored to the preven-
tion of pre-commitments.  The Clause focuses on language that pledges 
the candidate to pursue a certain course of action.  If honored, such a 
pledge would preclude a judge from having an open mind.  But the 
Clause does not prevent a candidate from announcing his views on an 
issue and informing the voters about his general approach to particu-
lar legal questions.  To be sure, the difference in practice between the 
announcement of views and the making of a pledge may be thin.  Cer-
tainly, many voters will hear announcements of views as commitments 
to future decisions, and candidates may very well intend voters to hear 
just that.  But the language of pledge or promise signals not simply 
that a candidate has views on an issue but that he has prejudged future 
cases in which that issue will arise.  The extra moral obligation that 
may arise from promissory language and the direct challenge to the 
132 In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 7. 
133 Cf. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 89 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (finding that a judi-
cial candidate’s statement that she would be “absolutely a reflection of what the com-
munity wants” violates the canons), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 180 (2003). 
134 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam). 
135 Indeed, in a recent survey, 95% of state judges strongly supported the state-
ment that “[j]udicial candidates should never make promises during elections about 
how they will rule in cases that may come before them.”  Greenberg Quinlan Rosner 
Res. Inc., Justice at Stake Campaign, Justice at Stake—State Judges Frequency Ques-
tionnaire question 34, at 12 (Nov. 5, 2001-Jan. 2, 2002),  available at http:// 
www.greenbergresearch.com/publications/reports/fqjJASjudges.pdf (last accessed 
Oct. 7, 2004). 
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norm of open-mindedness that results from a pledge make these 
statements significantly different from the mere announcement of 
views.  The Pledges or Promises Clause is narrowly tailored to pre-
clude the harm to the judicial function created by promissory lan-
guage without interfering with the benefits of free expression, voter 
information, and competitive elections that arise out of the freedom 
of candidates to tell voters their views.136
C.  The Commit or Appear to Commit Clause 
As previously noted, in 1990 the ABA dropped the Announce 
Clause from its Model Code of Judicial Conduct and replaced it with a 
provision that a judicial candidate not “make statements that commit 
or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies 
or issues that are likely to come before the court.”137  By the time of 
the White decision, twenty-seven states had adopted canons tracking 
the ABA’s language.138  Prior to White, a handful of courts that had in-
validated the Announce Clause had also upheld the Commit Clause.139  
Because Minnesota had not adopted the Commit Clause, White did 
not address its constitutionality, although the Court’s treatment of the 
meaning of impartiality and the problems of focusing on campaign 
statements raises the same uncertainties for the Commit Clause that it 
does for the Pledges or Promises Clause. 
To be sure, one sentence in one of White’s footnotes constitutes a 
more direct, albeit highly ambiguous, challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the Commit Clause.  As the Court explained, at oral argument 
respondents contended that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s narrow-
ing construction of the Announce Clause rendered its scope “no 
broader than” the Commit Clause.140  The Court labeled that argu-
136 Cf. Alan B. Morrison, The Judge Has No Robes:  Keeping the Electorate in the Dark 
About What Judges Think About the Issues, 36 IND. L. REV. 719, 724-26 (2003) (condemn-
ing the Announce Clause but arguing that the Pledges or Promises Clause is constitu-
tional). 
137 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). 
138 Moerke, supra note 81, at 268. 
139 See, e.g., Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 
315 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (finding that the Commit Clause passes strict scrutiny and does 
not violate a candidate’s free speech rights); Deters v. Judicial Ret. & Removal 
Comm’n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 205 (Ky. 1994) (stating that “there is a compelling state in-
terest in so limiting judicial campaign speech, because the making of campaign com-
mitments on issues likely to come before the court tends to undermine the fundamen-
tal fairness and impartiality of the legal system”). 
140 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 773 n.5 (2002). 
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ment “somewhat curious,” as the Minnesota Supreme Court had re-
jected a proposal to replace the Announce Clause with the Commit 
Clause.141  The Court then stated:  “We do not know whether the an-
nounce clause (as interpreted by state authorities) and the 1990 ABA 
canon [that is, the Commit Clause,] are one and the same.  No aspect 
of our constitutional analysis turns on this question.”142  Certainly one 
plausible reading of this delphic statement is that even if the An-
nounce Clause were the equivalent of the Commit Clause, it would 
still have been unconstitutional.  That would surely spell the doom of 
the Commit Clause.  However, it is unlikely that the Court’s statement 
was intended to resolve the constitutionality of the Commit Clause.  
The White respondents had sought to import only the “likely to come 
before the court”143 language of the Commit Clause into the An-
nounce Clause in order to narrow the latter clause’s very broad pro-
scription of the announcement of “views on disputed legal or political 
issues.”144  Two courts of appeals, including the Eighth Circuit in White, 
had previously narrowed and upheld the Announce Clause by reading 
in “likely to come before the court.”145  The Court’s statement indi-
cates that even if the Announce Clause had been limited to an-
nouncements concerning legal and political issues “likely to come be-
fore the court” it still would have failed to pass constitutional muster 
because it still would not have been properly aimed at promoting the 
interest in impartiality-as-open-mindedness (assuming that impartial-
ity-as-open-mindedness is a compelling governmental interest).  But 
there is nothing in the case to suggest that the lower court or the re-
spondents thought that the Announce Clause’s proscription of the 
“announcing” of views reached no further than statements of com-
mitment.  It is highly implausible to suggest that “announce” and 
“commit” mean the same thing. 
Rather, statements committing a candidate with respect to a case, 
controversy, or issue are likely to resemble pledges and promises in 
both content and effect.  So, too, like the Pledges or Promises Clause, 
the proscription of candidate commitments with respect to cases, con-
troversies, or issues promotes the interests in protecting judicial im-
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 774 n.5. 
143 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). 
144 White, 536 U.S. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5A(3)(d)(i) (2000)). 
145 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2001); Stret-
ton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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partiality-as-open-mindedness and the appearance of such impartial-
ity—interests that ought to be constitutionally compelling.  As the
Kentucky Supreme Court observed in upholding the enforcement of
that state’s Commit Clause, “[j]ustice can hardly be blind if the judge
has made a pre-election commitment or prejudgment which causes
him or her to apply the blindfold only as to one side of an issue.”146
Indeed, the concept of commitment is sufficiently similar to the
notion of pledge or promise that it is not completely clear what the
Commit Clause adds to the Pledges or Promises Clause.  Perhaps it
has the benefit of assuring that the regulation is not limited to cam-
paign statements that use the magic words of “pledge” or “promise.”
If so, the effect would be similar to Congress’s recent action in the
campaign finance area of adopting restrictions on “electioneering
communication” in order to undo the effect of court decisions that
had narrowly limited the prior statutory term “expenditure” to so-
called “express advocacy.”147  In that case, it would be the Pledges or
Promises Clause, which would cover a subset of the pre-commitments
that fall within the Commit Clause, rather than the Commit Clause
that is redundant.
The history of the Commit Clause suggests that it was derived
from the Announce Clause and was intended to approach the Pledges
or Promises Clause.  But other than indicating that it is the concept of
pre-commitment that is being regulated, rather than specific linguistic
forms, it is not clear what particular work the Commit Clause does,
and probably the Pledges or Promises Clause and the Commit Clause
ought to be merged.  Indeed, in its latest amendments to the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, the ABA has done precisely that by propos-
ing language that in a single clause prohibits judicial candidates from
making “pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with
the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office.”148
146
Deters v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 205 (Ky. 1994).
147
See McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 650-54 (2003) (describing the wordplay
involved in statutory construction around campaign finance reform).
148
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5A(3)(d) (amended Aug. 2003).
Similarly, some state supreme courts have revised their canons to subsume the prohibi-
tion on pledges and promises into the broader Commit Clause.  Thus, Canon 5B fo
the California Code of Judicial Ethics (amended Dec. 22, 2003) states:  “A candidate
for election or appointment to judicial office shall not (1) make statements to the elec-
torate or the appointing authority that commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies, or issues that could come before the courts . . . .”  Canon 7B(1)(b)of the
Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct  (amended Jan. 7, 2004) provides simply that a can-
didate for “any judicial office that is filled by public election between competing can-
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The Commit Clause goes beyond the Pledges or Promises Clause 
in one significant but troubling respect.  The canon precludes not just 
commitments but statements that “appear to commit” a candidate to a 
specific course of judicial action.149  That would be unexceptionable if 
the only effect of the phrase were to indicate that the Commit Clause 
is not limited to statements that use the magic word “commit” but ex-
tends to any statement that, in context, would be treated by the rea-
sonable listener as making a commitment rather than merely express-
ing a viewpoint, regardless of the precise words used.  The danger, 
however, is that statements of judicial philosophy or political belief 
could be treated by a state supreme court or a state judicial conduct 
commission as appearing to make a commitment even if the language 
used by the candidate did not state that the candidate viewed himself 
bound to a specific decision. 
Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court sanctioned a candidate who 
labeled himself a “pro-life candidate,” finding that self-description 
“appeared to commit him to a position not only on abortion matters, 
but also on other controversies.”150  Yet, surely a judge could consider 
himself pro-life as a matter of personal philosophy without feeling 
bound to reach a particular result in a case involving right-to-life is-
sues if the evidence and the law pointed in the other direction.  Simi-
larly, the New York State Judicial Conduct Commission found that a 
candidate who identified herself as a “[l]aw and order [c]andidate” 
had “committed, or appeared to commit, [herself] to a pro-
prosecution bias in criminal cases.”151  Again, announcing that one is a 
“law and order” judge does not commit a judge to resolve all issues 
against defendants.  Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals, which 
has vigorously defended the constitutionality of the canons, con-
cluded that “simply using the phrase ‘law and order’ in judicial cam-
paign literature does not amount to misconduct” since the phrase 
does not “compromise[] judicial impartiality.”152  In another case, the 
Washington Supreme Court held that a candidate who proclaimed 
himself “toughest on drunk driving” violated the Appear to Commit 
Clause by suggesting a precommitment in DWI cases, but that the 
same judge’s statement that he was a “tough, no-nonsense judge” was 
didates . . . shall not make statements that commit the candidate with respect to issues 
likely to come before the court.” 
149 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). 
150 Deters, 873 S.W.2d at 203. 
151 In re Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 735, 736 (N.Y. 2002) (per curiam). 
152 Id. at 736-37. 
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permissible since the claim “suggest[s] nothing more than a strict ap-
plication of the law.”153  These cases illustrate the vagueness and po-
tential breadth of the Appear to Commit prohibition. 
The Commit Clause, like the Pledges or Promises Clause, can be 
constitutionally applied only to statements which go beyond the ex-
pression of views concerning legal and political issues and use lan-
guage—not limited to the specific words “pledge,” “promise,” or 
“commit”—indicating that the candidate will, while on the bench, 
render decisions according to the commitment without due regard to 
the facts or law in a particular case.  However, as the Kentucky, New 
York, and Washington cases indicate, the restriction on statements 
that “appear to commit” a candidate is vague and, if applied to such 
non-promissory phrases as “right to life” or “law and order candidate,” 
goes too far in restricting candidate language that expresses a view-
point but does not indicate an intention to limit the judge’s freedom 
of action.  It is, thus, of doubtful constitutionality.  Indeed, two state 
courts that recently revised their canons, California and Georgia, re-
tained the pre-White prohibition on commitments but dropped the re-
striction on statements that “appear to commit” a candidate.154  The 
California Advisory Committee specifically noted that “the phrase ‘ap-
pear to commit’ has been deleted because . . . the phrase may have 
been overinclusive.”155  Similarly, in August 2003 the ABA amended its 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct to eliminate the proscription of 
statements that merely “appear” to commit the candidate.156
D.  Misrepresentations Clause 
The most frequently challenged provision of the state judicial 
campaign canons appears to be the restriction on false and misleading 
statements.  The 1972 ABA Code stated that a candidate for judicial 
office “should not . . . misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present 
153 In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 396 (Wash. 1988) (emphasis omitted). 
154 CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5B(1) (amended Dec. 22, 2003); GA. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(b) (amended Jan. 7, 2004). 
155 CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5B Advisory Comm. Cmt. (amended 
Dec. 22, 2003). 
156 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (1990).  As amended, the 
canon now provides that a judicial candidate shall not, “with respect to cases, contro-
versies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises or 
commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative 
duties of the office.”  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) 
(amended Aug. 2003). 
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position, or other fact.”157  The 1990 Model Code significantly modi-
fied the canon to provide that a judicial candidate may not “knowingly 
misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position or other fact 
concerning the candidate or an opponent.”158  As one commentator 
recently noted, “[m]ost states with elected judges have adopted one of 
these versions of the misrepresent clause.”159
In recent cases, courts have repeatedly invalidated the 1972 ver-
sion of the Misrepresentations Clause, while indicating that the 1990 
version would pass constitutional muster.160  These courts have indi-
cated that a requirement of intentional falsity—and the exclusion of 
innocent or negligent misstatements—is an essential predicate for 
regulation.  Relying on White’s application of strict scrutiny to judicial 
campaign codes, the Eleventh Circuit recently determined that 
“[n]egligent misstatements must be protected in order to give pro-
tected speech the ‘breathing space’ it requires.”161  The Michigan Su-
preme Court similarly reasoned that the “debate” concerning the 
“overall direction of the courts” that should take place during a judi-
cial election would be “impossible if judicial candidates are overly 
fearful of potential discipline for what they say” and, accordingly, held 
that the prohibition of misrepresentations had to be limited to know-
ing or reckless falsehoods.162  As a result of these and similar decisions, 
most state judicial campaign codes now prohibit only intentional or 
reckless falsehoods.163
Even as so limited, is such a restriction on judicial campaign 
speech constitutional?  Misrepresentations, even intentional ones, do 
not threaten the compelling interest in impartiality-as-open-
157 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972). 
158 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii) (1990). 
159 Moerke, supra note 81, at 310. 
160 See, e.g., Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) (narrowing 
Georgia’s canon to forbid only intentional dissemination of misrepresentations); But-
ler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 218 (Ala. 2001) (narrowing the 
Alabama canon to forbid only dissemination of demonstrable falsehoods with actual 
malice); In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 43 (Mich. 2000) (narrowing the Michigan 
canon to prohibit only knowing or reckless misrepresentations). 
161 Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1320. 
162 In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 42-43. 
163 Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Weaver, the Georgia Supreme 
Court revised its Code of Judicial Conduct to narrow the ban on misrepresentation to 
apply only to candidates’ publishing “a false statement of fact concerning themselves 
or their candidacies, or concerning any opposing candidate or candidacy, with knowl-
edge of the statement’s falsity or with reckless disregard for the statement’s truth or 
falsity.”  GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (amended Jan. 7, 2004). 
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mindedness that ought to save the Pledges or Promises Clause and the 
Commit Clause.  Most of the courts that have considered challenges to 
the Misrepresentations Clause have focused on the relatively amor-
phous interest in “judicial integrity,” finding that the ban on misrep-
resentations is necessary “so as not to damage the actual and per-
ceived integrity” of the courts.164  In this view, uncivil, undignified 
“mudslinging” by judicial candidates—language normal to, if not ex-
pected of, executive and legislative candidates who operate in the 
rough and tumble world of politics—is considered to be a “threat to 
judicial integrity and public confidence in the judiciary.”165
It is not clear if the interest in integrity is unique to the judiciary, 
or whether the integrity of the judiciary is more threatened by candi-
date misrepresentations than the integrity of elected executives and 
legislators.  Surely, there is a public interest in the honesty of all 
elected officials and in the public’s confidence in the honesty of all 
those in power.  Nor is it clear that the reputation of the judiciary is 
more fragile and more subject to the loss of public confidence than 
the reputations of the other branches of government, so that a special 
restriction on judicial candidate speech in the name of integrity is jus-
tified.  The canon limits the speech of judicial candidates who, if 
elected, can claim the same public mandate and legitimacy as all other 
elected officials.  It is not obvious why they, unlike their appointed 
counterparts, need the special mantle of being outside or above the 
hurly-burly of politics.  Moreover, it is not clear how well a ban on mis-
representations limited to knowing falsehoods actually promotes the 
image of judicial “civility and dignity”166 that defenders of the canons 
consider necessary to preserve the public’s belief in the integrity of 
the judiciary.  As so circumscribed, the Misrepresentations Clause 
permits “hyperbole, parody, epithet[s]” and “‘vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.’”167  These can be as nasty as any 
statements in legislative and executive elections and far more in ten-
sion with the goal of civil and dignified judicial elections than low-key, 
calmly expressed falsehoods.168
164 Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984); accord Butler, 
802 So. 2d at 215 (protecting the “reputation and integrity of the judiciary is a compel-
ling state interest”). 
165 Long, supra note 68, at 803. 
166 Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges:  Is There One “Best” Method?, 23 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995). 
167 In re Chmura, 626 N.W.2d at 886. 
168 See Mark Kozlowski, Should the Regulation of Judicial Candidate Speech Regarding 
Legal and Political Issues Be Reconsidered?, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 161, 167 (2001) (predicting 
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Perhaps the better defense of the Misrepresentations Clause is not 
that it promotes judicial integrity but that it advances the public inter-
est in informed judicial elections.  Candidate falsehoods are inconsis-
tent with the goal of an informed electorate advanced by the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny to judicial campaign codes.  In recent cases 
involving sanctions for misrepresentations, candidates have been 
found to have lied about their qualifications and the qualifications of 
their opponents;169 about an opponent’s judicial record;170 and about 
the content or nature of the endorsements they had received.171  Such 
misrepresentations actually make it harder for the public to get the 
information it needs to make an accurate and educated assessment of 
judicial candidates.  The ban on misrepresentations thus serves the in-
terest in the integrity of the electoral process by “protecting the politi-
cal process from distortions caused by false or inaccurate statements” 
at least as much as it promotes dignity and civility in judicial elec-
tions.172  By limiting the restriction to knowing falsehoods, the Misrep-
resentations Clause minimizes interference with robust political de-
bate while still barring statements that actually make it harder for the 
public to make an informed decision. 
The 1990 version of the Misrepresentations Clause ought to pass 
constitutional muster.  Because it regulates only knowing falsehoods, 
it is not even certain whether the clause would trigger strict judicial 
scrutiny, as the Supreme Court has indicated in other settings that 
knowing falsehoods can be penalized.173  Even if the Misrepresenta-
that recent decisions limiting the Misrepresentations Clause to knowing falsehoods will 
“encourage the use of the underhanded allegation and the cheap shot that may be said 
to fall short of being outright falsehoods”). 
169 See, e.g., In re Alley, 699 So. 2d 1369, 1369 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam) (determin-
ing that a judicial candidate had misrepresented her qualifications); In re Shanley, 774 
N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. 2002) (per curiam) (“[P]etitioner misrepresented her educa-
tional background.”). 
170 See, e.g., In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 962 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam) (“Respon-
dent’s . . . purpose was to create an impression that Judge Clem was causing needless 
delays and holding a large number of cases under advisement when there was contrary 
evidence before her . . . .”). 
171 See, e.g., Summe v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Ky. 
1997) (finding that candidate promulgated campaign literature that looked like a 
newspaper’s independent endorsement of her candidacy); In re Burick, 705 N.E.2d 
422, 426, 428 (Ohio 1999) (fining and reprimanding candidate for misleading en-
dorsements). 
172 In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 40. 
173 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) (“States 
should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defama-
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tions Clause does trigger strict scrutiny, the interest in informed elec-
toral decision making is a compelling one and ought to justify such a 
restriction on candidate speech. 
Unlike the issues raised by the Pledges or Promises and the Com-
mit Clause, it is not clear whether the fate of the Misrepresentations 
Clause ought to turn on the distinct character of the judicial function 
or the special nature of judicial elections.  The same concern over in-
formed voter decision making ought to provide the compelling inter-
est that would support a general prohibition on candidates’ knowingly 
making false statements in elections.  Indeed, one study in 2001 found 
that seventeen states prohibit false speech concerning political candi-
dates.174  It is probably the case that the belief that judicial elections 
are special, and that judicial candidates should be held to higher 
standards of civility, dignity, and integrity, explains why the Misrepre-
sentations Clause was initially adopted and continues to be retained.  
But its constitutionality is better supported by the compelling interest 
in informed voter decision making, an interest just as applicable to 
legislative and executive elections as to judicial elections.175
tory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (allowing public officials to recover damages only 
if a newspaper knowingly or recklessly publishes false items about them); see also Garri-
son v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (“[T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once 
at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in 
which economic, social, or political change is to be effected.”). 
174 Becky Kruse, Comment, The Truth in Masquerade:  Regulating False Ballot Proposi-
tion Ads Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CAL. L. REV. 129, 132 (2001).  Ten of 
those states, plus one other state, also prohibit false speech concerning ballot proposi-
tions.  Id. 
175 There is little case law on whether states can prohibit falsehoods by campaign 
participants outside the context of judicial elections.  Two federal district courts have 
held that barring knowingly false statements in political campaigns could be constitu-
tional, but found the particular statutes before them flawed on procedural grounds.  
In Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 93-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d mem., 423 U.S. 1041 
(1976), the court agreed that campaign statements made with “actual malice,” that is, 
with the knowledge that they are false or with reckless disregard of whether they are 
false, are unprotected by the First Amendment, but concluded that the New York law 
penalizing campaign misrepresentations was unconstitutionally overbroad because of 
its failure to include an actual malice requirement.  The court also found that the stat-
ute’s enforcement mechanism—an administrative proceeding brought by the state 
board of elections, without judicial review—provided an unconstitutional and inade-
quate method for protecting the free speech rights at stake.  Id. at 99-100.  In Pestrak v. 
Ohio Elections Commission, 670 F. Supp. 1368, 1370, 1375 (S.D. Ohio 1987), the court 
found that the statute prohibiting the making of campaign falsehoods “knowingly and 
with intent to affect the outcome of such campaign” properly criminalized speech “not 
entitled to the protection of the First Amendment,” but, as in Vanasco, concluded that 
the administrative procedure for enforcing the ban was unconstitutional.  The Sixth 
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E.  Personal Solicitation of Campaign Contributions 
Canon 5C(2) of the ABA Model Code provides that a judicial candi-
date “shall not personally solicit or accept campaign contributions.”176  
Instead, the candidate is authorized to establish “committees of re-
sponsible persons” that may “solicit and accept” campaign contribu-
tions.177  Virtually all states that conduct judicial elections have adopted 
the ban on judicial candidates’ personal solicitation of campaign con-
tributions.178  Prior to White, this ban, unlike the Announce and Mis-
representations Clauses, had been consistently validated and enforced 
in the courts.179
Circuit subsequently agreed that Ohio could prohibit knowingly false campaign state-
ments.  Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 926 F.2d 573, 577 (6th Cir. 1991).   
 One state court has invalidated a state law prohibiting political advertisements that 
include intentional falsehoods concerning material facts.  In State ex rel. Public Disclosure 
Commission v. 119 Vote No! Committee, 957 P.2d 691, 696-97 (Wash. 1998), a narrow ma-
jority of the Washington Supreme Court determined that even malicious campaign 
falsehoods must receive full First Amendment protection.  119 Vote No! Committee dealt 
primarily with the statute’s application to ballot proposition campaigns, but the court’s 
ruling invalidated the application of the anti-false-statement law to candidate cam-
paigns as well.  Id. at 697-98.  Washington subsequently adopted a law penalizing political 
advertising made with actual malice “that contains a false statement of material fact 
about a candidate for public office,” but exempted “statements made by a candidate or 
the candidate’s agent about the candidate himself or herself.”  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 42.17.530(1)(a) (West 2000). 
 More recently, in McKimm v. Ohio Elections Commission, 729 N.E.2d 364, 375 (Ohio 
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1078 (2001), the Ohio Supreme Court, after full review of 
the First Amendment issues, enforced an Ohio law prohibiting the dissemination with 
actual malice of a false statement concerning a candidate that is designed to promote 
the election or defeat of the candidate. 
176 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(2) (1990). 
177 Id. 
178 See Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and Present, and Judicial Elections, 35 IND. 
L. REV. 659, 666 (2002) (noting that thirty-five of the thirty-nine states that have judi-
cial elections ban candidates’ personal solicitations of contributions). 
179 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 883-85 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(enforcing a ban on personal solicitation of campaign funds); Stretton v. Disciplinary 
Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 1991) (allowing the states to prohibit personal solicita-
tion by candidate in order to avoid the appearance of coercion); In re Fadeley, 802 
P.2d 31, 44 (Or. 1990) (per curiam) (upholding the constitutionality of a ban on per-
sonal solicitation); In re Tennant, 516 S.E.2d 496 (W. Va. 1999) (enforcing a ban on 
personal solicitation of funds as necessary to reduce potential pressure on lawyers to 
contribute to a particular campaign); cf. Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 701 (N.D. 
Ohio 1996) (upholding a prohibition on a judicial candidate from spending money 
raised in connection with a campaign for non-judicial office, in part in order to back-
stop the ban on personal solicitation of judicial campaign funds). 
 One of the plaintiffs in White did challenge the Minnesota canon barring a candidate’s 
personal solicitation of campaign contributions.  The plaintiff acknowledged that the 
ban served the compelling state interest of preventing a threat to judicial impartiality 
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In Weaver v. Bonner, however, the Eleventh Circuit, relying on 
White, determined that Georgia’s ban on the personal solicitation of 
campaign funds by judicial candidates was unconstitutional.180  Weaver 
determined that the ban failed strict scrutiny because it was “not nar-
rowly tailored to serve Georgia’s compelling interest in judicial impar-
tiality.”181  Strict scrutiny applied because the ban “chilled” judicial candi-
dates “from speaking to potential contributors” about their potential 
contributions.182  Apparently assuming that the prevention of imparti-
ality—in this case, bias in favor of the donor—is a compelling state in-
terest, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the ban did not promote 
that interest since “the fact that judicial candidates require financial 
support” to run successful campaigns “does not suggest that they will 
be partial if they are elected.”183  On the other hand, “even if there is a 
risk that judges will be tempted to rule a particular way because of 
contributions or endorsements, this risk is not significantly reduced” 
by requiring that the candidate seek contributions through a commit-
tee rather than personally.184  “Successful candidates will feel beholden 
to the people who helped them get elected regardless of who did the 
soliciting of support.”185
Perhaps influenced by the Weaver decision, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court revised its Code of Judicial Conduct in 2003 to expressly 
permit a judicial candidate to “personally solicit campaign funds.”186  
and preventing the appearance of judicial impropriety.  Kelly, 247 F.3d at 883-84.  However, 
he argued that the ban was not narrowly tailored since the prevention of impropriety 
and the appearance of impropriety could be advanced by permitting a judicial candi-
date to make solicitations to large groups and to send out letters requesting money but 
requiring that contributions be sent to a campaign committee that would be barred 
from disclosing the identity of contributors to the candidate.  Id. at 884.  The Eighth Cir-
cuit, however, concluded that the plaintiff’s alternative would not obviate the appear-
ance of impropriety that results from personal solicitation and the “appearance, accu-
rate or not, that ‘justice is for sale’ and the expectation of impermissible favoritism.”  
Id.  The plaintiffs in White did not include a question relating to the personal solicita-
tion restriction in their petition for certiorari.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 
F.3d 1035, 1040 (8th Cir. 2004).  Consequently, the issue did not come before the Su-
preme Court. 
180 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 1322-23. 
185 Id. at 1323. 
186 N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(4) (amended Apr. 2, 2004).  The 
court’s decision has been criticized by district court judges and trial lawyers in the 
state.  See, e.g., Matthew Eisley, Election Rules Relaxed for Judges:  Permission to Solicit Law-
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The Maine Supreme Court, however, was unpersuaded by the Elev-
enth Circuit’s reasoning, holding that the ban on personal solicitation 
was justified because “[i]t is exactly this activity that potentially creates 
a bias, or at least the appearance of bias, for or against a party to a 
proceeding.”187  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit panel, in its reconsidera-
tion of White on remand from the Supreme Court, agreed that the ban 
on personal solicitation promotes “a kind of open-mindedness—
keeping candidates free from obligations that would hamper their 
ability to decide the law according to their own judgment rather than 
in accordance with implicit obligations to their financial benefac-
tors.”188
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is not simply internally contradic-
tory; it is unpersuasive.  The Supreme Court, in cases from Buckley 
through McConnell, has repeatedly held that campaign contributions 
raise the dangers of corruption—defined as candidates too compliant 
with the wishes of their donors—and appearance of corruption and 
that, accordingly, contributions to candidates may be limited.  Surely, 
solicitation—the act of asking for a contribution—raises the same 
dangers of undue influence and the appearance of impropriety as the 
contribution itself.  Indeed, personal solicitation highlights the dan-
gers of abuse by focusing on the potentially coercive nature of the re-
quest for contributions aimed at a potential donor who has or is likely 
to have business before the judge seeking the contribution.  Personal 
solicitation, thus, particularly threatens the appearance of impropriety 
and undermines the appearance of evenhanded treatment essential to 
the judicial role. 
The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on contributions 
are not subject to strict scrutiny.189  Contribution limits, the Court has 
determined, “entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the contribu-
tor’s ability to engage in free communication.”190  The restriction on 
donors is marginal because a donor who has hit the contribution ceil-
yers for Money Brings a Fear of ‘Shakedowns,’ NAT’L L.J., Oct.  13, 2003, at 7 (citing several 
attorneys’ fears regarding personal solicitation of campaign funds). 
187 In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 351 (Me. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1722 
(2004). 
188 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1048 (2004).  This opinion 
was subsequently vacated when the Eighth Circuit determined to grant rehearing en 
banc.  Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10232, at *4 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004). 
189 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 656-57 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-88 (2000). 
190 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976) (per curiam). 
 
226 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 181 
 
ing can continue to participate in the campaign through independent 
expenditures or other forms of political expression.  The only signifi-
cant constitutional concern raised by a contribution limitation is 
whether it would “prevent[] candidates and political committees from 
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”191
The restriction on personal solicitation by a candidate should be 
subject to the same less rigorous standard of review as the restriction 
on contributions.  The ban on personal solicitation does not interfere 
with the candidate’s freedom to speak in support of her candidacy 
since it does not restrict any speech by the candidate about his cam-
paign other than the pitch for a donation.  Nor does the ban restrict 
the ability of potential supporters to donate to the judicial candidate’s 
campaign.  In that sense, the ban on personal solicitation of contribu-
tions is less restrictive than the contribution ceilings that the Court 
has repeatedly upheld.  The only constitutional issue is whether pro-
hibiting personal solicitation, and requiring the candidate instead to 
rely on her campaign committee to solicit donations, fatally under-
mines the ability of candidates to wage financially viable campaigns.192  
With more and more money being poured into judicial election cam-
paigns, it would be difficult to find that the ban on personal solicita-
tion has interfered with the ability of judicial candidates to amass the 
necessary campaign resources.193
In some states the ban on personal solicitation might arguably be 
unconstitutional because of its limited reach.  Although the ABA 
canon bans personal solicitation, it does not prohibit the judicial can-
didate from learning the identities of her financial supporters.  The 
Georgia ban was similarly limited, a fact relied upon by the Eleventh 
Circuit in Weaver v. Bonner.194  Is the threat to judicial impartiality and 
191 Id. at 21; accord McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 655-57; Nixon, 528 U.S. at 395-97. 
192 A ban on personal solicitation that continues to permit solicitation through 
agents is distinguishable from the restriction on solicitation subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny.  See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988) 
(subjecting the speech of professional fundraisers to strict scrutiny). 
193 See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 58, at 850 (stating that in the 2000 elections, 
state supreme court candidates raised $45.5 million, a 61% increase over the previous 
peak in 1998, and set fundraising records in ten of the twenty states that held such 
elections); GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 23, at 15-16 (noting that in 2000 and 
2001 ten state supreme court candidates raised more than $1 million apiece for their 
campaigns; in Ohio, the four candidates for state supreme court together raised more 
than $6.2 million; and in Texas, the ten candidates together raised more than $5.8 mil-
lion). 
194 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002).  Not all state versions of the ban on per-
sonal solicitations are so limited.  The Minnesota canon considered by the Eighth Cir-
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to the appearance of impartiality—as well as the potential coercion of 
donors—qualitatively greater when the candidate solicits the contribu-
tion personally?  The answer should be “Yes.”  Personal solicitation 
can easily involve a personal meeting between candidate and donor, 
with a handshake and the opportunity for each to look the other in 
the eye while the candidate makes his pitch.  Similarly, a personal 
telephone call can heighten the sense of direct contact between the 
candidate and the donor.  Even without language of pledge or prom-
ise the candidate is likely to have a heightened sense of gratitude to 
the donor and subsequent sympathy for the donor’s interests if the 
candidate, when in office, is ever called upon to make a decision in-
volving that donor’s interest.  Moreover, the candidate’s personal so-
licitation makes it that much harder for the potential donor to say 
“No,” because the donor knows that the candidate knows that the do-
nor has been directly asked for a contribution; the failure to contrib-
ute may be treated as a matter of hostility rather than indifference.  
From the public’s perspective, the appearance of the possibility of 
special treatment is likely to be much greater if it is known that the 
candidate personally solicited a contribution from someone who later 
had a matter before the candidate-as-judge. 
These concerns about the heightened potential for favoritism, co-
ercion, and the appearance of special treatment arising from personal 
solicitation are applicable to all elections and conceivably might be 
used to justify a comparable restriction in other settings.195  But two 
factors distinctive to the judicial setting strengthen the case for the 
canon.  First, whereas legislators and executives regularly meet with 
individuals and the representatives of interest groups in private, one-
cuit panels in Kelly and in White, on remand from the Supreme Court, includes a provi-
sion prohibiting the candidate’s campaign committee from disclosing to the candidate 
either the identity of campaign contributors or the identity of those who were solicited 
for contributions but declined to contribute.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 
F.3d 1035, 1049 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated and reh’g, en banc, granted sub nom. Republican 
Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10232, at *4 
(8th Cir. May 25, 2004). 
195 Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS:  A NEW PARADIGM 
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 25-44, 93-110 (2002) (proposing a system of anonymous dona-
tions in which campaign contributors give to candidates through a blind trust).  Like 
the ban on personal solicitations, the Ackerman and Ayres proposal for anonymous dona-
tions seeks to sever the tie between donors and candidates without limiting the size of 
contributions.  The Ackerman and Ayres proposal would permit candidates to person-
ally solicit contributions, but candidates would be unable to know whether and how 
much these solicited donors contributed.  In making their proposal, Ackerman and 
Ayres they rely in part on the state canons that prohibit judicial candidates from learn-
ing the identities of their donors.  Id. at 109. 
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sided sessions in which those individuals or interest groups are free to 
advocate their concerns and seek support, the nature of the judicial 
function ordinarily precludes private or ex parte contacts between a 
judge and a party who has an interest before the judge.  Personal 
meetings or other contacts by judges with donors and potential do-
nors would thus pose a greater threat to the appearance of impartial-
ity and to impartiality itself than would meetings of other elected offi-
cials with donors.  Second, a disproportionate fraction of 
contributions to judicial candidates comes from two discrete interest 
groups:  lawyers who are likely to appear before the judges and clients 
who have regular interests before the courts.196  This exacerbates the 
sense that personal solicitation undermines impartiality and the ap-
pearance of impartiality, as well as underscores the concern that per-
sonal solicitations raise the danger of coercion.197  Thus, whether or 
not a ban on personal solicitation of campaign contributions could be 
enforced against legislative and executive candidates, it ought to be 
constitutional in the special context of judicial elections. 
F.  Restrictions on Partisan Political Activity 
The ABA Model Code includes provisions, which most states have 
adopted, precluding judges from participating in a range of partisan 
political activity other than support for their own campaigns.  These 
forbidden activities typically include holding office in a political party, 
publicly endorsing or opposing another candidate for public office, 
making speeches for a political party, or soliciting funds for or making 
contributions to a political party.198  Even states that provide for parti-
196 GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 23, at 17-18.  But cf. Schotland, supra note 58, 
at 856 (“[W]hile many judicial campaigns are funded significantly by lawyers’ contribu-
tions, by no means is that a prevailing pattern.”). 
197 See In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 41 (Or. 1990) (per curiam) (“[T]he spectacle of 
lawyers or potential litigants directly handing over money to judicial candidates should 
be avoided if the public is to have faith in the impartiality of its judiciary.”). 
198 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B (1990).  For recent cases apply-
ing these and similar prohibitions, see In re McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 2002) 
(stating that “a judge may not publicly endorse a candidate for public office”); Shake v. 
Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 122 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Ky. 2003) (holding that “a 
judge or judicial candidate may not make a contribution in order to attend a political 
fundraiser”); In re Shea, 815 So. 2d 813, 817-18 (La. 2002) (per curiam) (censuring a 
judge for even a “good faith” violation of the prohibition on “contributions to other 
candidates”); see also Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 698 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (citing 
examples of state regulation of partisan activity by judges), aff’d, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 
1998). 
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san judicial elections may adopt restraints on the partisan political ac-
tivities of judicial candidates. 
White did not address the constitutionality of restrictions on parti-
san behavior.  Although the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct’s 
limits on partisan activities were challenged by the plaintiffs, upheld 
by the Eighth Circuit,199 and raised in the plaintiff’s petition for certio-
rari, the Supreme Court limited its review to the Announce Clause.200  
After White, the constitutionality of restrictions on the political activi-
ties of judges and judicial candidates was sharply called into question 
in Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct,201 a federal 
district court decision involving a New York town justice and state su-
preme court judicial candidate who attended a Conservative Party 
fundraising dinner and served as keynote speaker at the event.202  Rely-
ing on White, the court subjected the restrictions on partisan political 
activity to strict judicial scrutiny and concluded that they were not 
narrowly tailored to promote the state’s interests in judicial impartial-
ity and independence.203  Moreover, the court’s opinion suggested 
that even a more modest restriction on the political activity of judges 
would not pass muster so long as the state continued to elect judges in 
partisan elections: 
[A] wholesale prohibition on participating in political activity for fear of 
influencing a judge ignores the fact that a judicial candidate must have 
at one time participated in politics or would not find him or herself in 
the position of a candidate. . . . [A] rule prohibiting an elected judge or 
judicial candidate from participating in politics is not narrowly tailored 
to serve the state’s interest in an independent judiciary.  This is particu-
larly true in light of the political process by which judges are elected.
204
A few months later, however, the New York Court of Appeals 
strongly affirmed the constitutionality of the state’s restrictions on ju-
dicial candidate political behavior.  In re Raab205 involved a disciplinary 
proceeding against a state supreme court justice who had taken part 
in a Working Families Party (WFP) phone bank and attended a WFP 
199 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 868-76 (8th Cir. 2001). 
200 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1040 (2002). 
201 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74, 80-81 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).  The Second Circuit vacated the 
decision on grounds that the district court should have abstained from exercising ju-
risdiction due to an ongoing state disciplinary proceeding, as per Younger v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 37 (1971).  351 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2812 (2004). 
202 Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 74, 80-81. 
203 Id. at 91-92. 
204 Id. at 88-89. 
205 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam). 
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screening meeting at which the endorsements of candidates for both 
judicial and nonjudicial offices were considered.206  The court of ap-
peals held that the restrictions promoted the compelling interests in 
judicial impartiality and independence, and public confidence in the 
judiciary.  Rejecting the approach taken by the federal district court, 
the state court of appeals concluded that 
[p]recisely because the State has chosen election as one means of select-
ing judges, there is a heightened risk that the public, including litigants 
and the bar, might perceive judges as beholden to a particular leader or 
party after they assume judicial duties.  The political activity rules are 
carefully designed to alleviate this concern by limiting the degree of in-
volvement of judicial candidates . . . without unduly burdening the can-
didates’ ability to participate in their own campaigns.
207
The Spargo court correctly noted the close connection between 
partisan activity and judicial campaigns in states with partisan judicial 
elections.208  Spargo, a politically active lawyer, no doubt owed at least 
some of the party support he received in his successful elections to the 
bench to his work with the party.  Similarly, Judge Raab testified, in 
the case brought against him, that he had volunteered to work for the 
WFP in order to win what he considered to be a crucial endorsement 
in what he expected would be an uphill race.209  As these cases suggest, 
the limitations on partisan activity by judicial candidates do not easily 
square with a system that uses a partisan ballot for judicial elections.  
These restrictions may be particularly burdensome for challengers 
who need to demonstrate their partisan bona fides in order to win a 
party nomination—and, thus, a place on the ballot—and key en-
dorsements.  In addition to burdening the political participatory 
rights of the candidates, these restrictions may also curb judicial elec-
toral competitiveness.  The Spargo court was also correct in suggesting 
that the sweeping ban on partisan activities is far broader than would 
be necessary to prevent impartiality-as-bias.  Surely, active involvement 
in a party would result in actual bias in just the relative handful of 
cases in which party leaders, party activists, or the political party itself 
are lawyers or litigants.  As Spargo contended, recusal would be suffi-
cient under those circumstances.210  Nor does partisan political activ-
ism constitute a pledge or precommitment to a particular course of 
206 Id. at 1288. 
207 Id. at 1292-93. 
208 Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89. 
209 In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1288. 
210 Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89. 
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action in a particular case.  Rather, political activity is, at most, akin to 
the announcement of views or a general statement of philosophy. 
However, Spargo significantly understates the potential of partisan 
activity to undermine judicial independence.  Political parties consti-
tute a crucial structural mechanism linking up elected officials within 
a legislative chamber, between chambers in the same legislature, be-
tween separate branches of government, and even between different 
levels of government.  Parties can play an important role in the formu-
lation of shared policies across different political institutions and in 
persuading members of the same party to go along with a common 
policy.  The Eighth Circuit put it well in its pre-White decision uphold-
ing Minnesota’s restrictions on partisan judicial activity: 
Political parties specialize in the business of electing candidates and have 
a powerful machinery for achieving that end, including large member-
ship and fund-raising organizations.  Those parties are simply in a better 
position than other organizations to hold a candidate in thrall.  More-
over, because political parties have comprehensive platforms, obligation 
to a party has a great likelihood of compromising a judge’s independ-
ence on a wide array of issues.  Finally, legislatures are bodies in which, 
for the most part, the members owe allegiance to a political party, not 
only for financial support and endorsement in their campaigns for of-
fice, but also for political support within the legislative process itself. . . . 
[T]he sharing of common partisan affiliation plays an integral role in 
enactment of legislation.  If the judiciary is then expected to review such 
legislation neutrally, a State may conclude that it is crucial that the 
judges not be beholden to a party responsible for enactment of the legis-
lation, or to one that opposed it.
211
Indeed, in McConnell v. FEC the Supreme Court recently empha-
sized the particular dangers to government integrity posed by the 
“special relationship and unity of interest” between a political party 
and the elected officeholders belonging to the party.212  McConnell up-
held new federal statutory restrictions on donations to political par-
ties, including donations that were neither solicited by candidates nor 
used by the party to aid specific candidates.  The Court recognized 
that due to the “close ties that candidates and officeholders have with 
their parties,” large donations to the parties run the risk of unduly in-
fluencing the decisions of elected officials who belong to those parties 
and of creating the appearance of such undue influence.213
211 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 876 (8th Cir. 2001). 
212 124 S. Ct. 619, 661 (2003). 
213 Id. at 665. 
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The “special relationship” between parties and officeholders that 
the Court recognized in McConnell can also threaten judicial inde-
pendence by too closely linking judges to party leaders and the pref-
erences of those leaders, even in cases in which neither the party 
leaders nor the party itself are participating.  Judges who are politi-
cally active within their parties can come under pressure to conform 
their judicial decisions to the party line.  So, too, judges who endorse 
party candidates, speak at party conventions, or solicit funds for party 
causes are likely to be perceived by the public as subject to partisan in-
fluences and, thus, unlikely to provide impartial justice in cases where 
party positions are implicated. 
This can undermine public confidence in the independence of 
the judiciary as well.  In its reconsideration of Minnesota’s ban on par-
tisan political activities, on remand from the Supreme Court after 
White, the Eighth Circuit panel reiterated its prior analysis that the 
canon’s special restrictions on partisan activities “are aimed at forms 
of obligation which are more subtle than outright corruption, but 
which the state still has a compelling interest in avoiding in its judici-
ary.”214  However, the panel expressed concern that the argument 
raised by the Supreme Court—that the Announce Clause was uncon-
stitutional in part because it was underinclusive as it applied only to 
election campaign statements and not to earlier announcements of 
political views—might also call into question the constitutionality of 
some of the partisan activity restrictions, such as those dealing with at-
tendance at party gatherings and public statements of identification 
with the party, which apply only during the campaign period.215  As a 
result, the panel remanded the question of the constitutionality of the 
partisan activity restrictions to the district court for further considera-
tion.216  Ten weeks later, this decision, as well as the panel’s decision 
upholding the anti-personal solicitation canon, was vacated by the 
Eighth Circuit, which voted to rehear both issues en banc.217
214 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004), va-
cated and reh’g, en banc, granted sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-
4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10232, at *4 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004). 
215 White, 361 F.3d at 1048.  The court saw no underinclusiveness problem in re-
stricting endorsements during campaigns since “[t]he endorsement clause only makes 
sense during the time-frame of an election.”  Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10232, at *4 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004).  As of the printing of this Article, oral ar-
gument of the rehearing en banc was scheduled for October 20, 2004.  Notice to All 
Counsel:  October 18-24, 2004, supra note 22, at 4. 
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As I have suggested earlier, White’s argument—that restrictions on 
judicial statements or activity that apply only during the pre-election 
period are constitutionally suspect as underinclusive—makes little 
sense, because the pre-election period is quite distinctive, and state-
ments made during that period have a special significance.  So, too, 
the fact that a judge may have been politically active before she as-
cended to the bench does not render partisan activity restrictions on 
sitting judges underinclusive.  We have a long tradition of partisan po-
litical figures becoming distinguished nonpartisan judges.  Restric-
tions targeting judicial candidates and sitting judges appropriately dis-
tinguish between partisan figures and judges who are expected to 
separate themselves, while on the bench, from partisan politics. 
Restrictions on partisan political activity should be constitutional 
whether or not the state runs its judicial elections on partisan lines.  
Indeed, partisan judicial elections do not ameliorate the threat to ju-
dicial independence; they heighten it.  Although there is a tension be-
tween providing for partisan elections while restricting the partisan 
political activities of candidates, the two positions are not contradic-
tory.  The partisan ballot line, like the announcement of views on dis-
puted political and legal issues, provides the voter with a general sense 
of where the candidate stands and how the candidate may differ from 
the candidates of other parties.  In low-salience judicial elections, 
where, typically, voters will have little other information about the 
candidates, this information can be vital.  But greater political activism 
links the candidate-judge ever more tightly to the party.  This may 
lead party leaders to treat judges as comparable to other party-elected 
officeholders and may undermine the ability of politically active 
judges to distance themselves from their parties when performing 
their judicial function.  By forcing a measure of party-candidate dis-
tance, the political activity canons reinforce the separation of powers 
and emphasize the significance of judicial independence.218
CONCLUSION:  BEYOND THE CANONS 
Notwithstanding White, most of the canons regulating judicial 
campaign activities should be able to pass constitutional muster.  As 
218 The constitutional case for these canons becomes stronger if, as In re Raab 
found, the precedents upholding statutes that limit the partisan political activities of 
public employees apply.  In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) 
(citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)); 
see also United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 93 (1947) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of restrictions on the political activities of civil service employees). 
 
234 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 181 
Part I points out, we do not have one uniform set of constitutional 
standards that govern all elections.  Rather, the rules governing such 
fundamental issues as the composition of the electorate, the weighting 
of votes, and restrictions on campaign funding can vary according to 
the nature of the decision to be made or the office to be determined 
by the election.  Given our mixed set of electoral rules, White’s unsur-
prising determination that the First Amendment applies to judicial 
elections does not require that judicial elections be governed by the 
same set of campaign speech and conduct provisions as applies to 
elections for legislative and executive office. 
The nature of the judicial function justifies some restrictions on 
campaign practices that would be invalid in the context of elections 
for legislative or executive office.  With respect to the canons that have 
been the primary targets of constitutional challenges in recent years, 
the goals of protecting judicial impartiality-as-open-mindedness and 
judicial independence ought to provide compelling justifications for 
prohibitions on candidate pledges and promises; for enforcement of a 
properly drafted ban on statements that make commitments; and for 
restrictions on the candidate’s personal solicitation of contributions 
and the candidate’s partisan political activities.  The canon against 
knowing misrepresentations would probably be valid even when ap-
plied to nonjudicial elections and can certainly be enforced in judicial 
elections. 
Yet, it is unclear what difference the continuing constitutionality 
of the canons would make.  Many judicial election campaigns are 
likely to remain largely low-salience noncompetitive contests, with vot-
ers receiving inadequate information.  Judges will be subject to struc-
tural pressures to consider whether to abide by public opinion in high 
visibility cases, as well as to take into account the concerns of their 
contributors and their parties.  The difference between the an-
nouncement of views and the making of commitments is an important 
point for constitutional purposes, but it is a highly subtle one that may 
be lost on voters, litigants, and judges alike in heated campaigns.  
Moreover, once the canons are applied not simply to specific words of 
pledge or promise but to the general sense of whether campaign 
statements amount to a prejudgment, the distinction between an-
nouncements and commitments may be difficult to draw in particular 
cases.  That may make some candidates uncertain as to exactly what 
they can say and also give rise to dangers of arbitrary or partisan en-
forcement. 
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Two other steps, either supplementing or supplanting the canons, 
might be useful in increasing the information available to voters, re-
ducing the campaign-based pressures on judges, and facilitating ro-
bust campaign debate.  First, states could provide public funding for 
judicial candidates.  The need for campaign contributions can be as 
great a threat to judicial impartiality as statements concerning con-
tested cases or issues.  Recent opinion polls have found that few peo-
ple think that judicial decisions are affected by the content of cam-
paign statements but that roughly three-quarters of those surveyed 
think that campaign contributions affect judicial outcomes.219  Far 
more than the ban on personal solicitation, public funding, by provid-
ing judicial candidates with a disinterested source of funds, could alle-
viate the danger that campaign contributions will bias decisions.  Fur-
ther, by assuring candidates funding above the amounts the 
candidates can raise from private donors, public funding would in-
crease the ability of judicial candidates to present themselves to the 
voters.  So, too, public funding can reduce the burdens of fundraising 
and increase the funds available to challengers, thereby generally in-
creasing electoral competitiveness.220  Indeed, better than any other 
regulatory tool, public funding could simultaneously advance the mul-
tiple goals of unfettered political expression, voter information, com-
petitive elections, and judicial impartiality and independence.221
North Carolina recently took a dramatic step in reconsidering its 
regulation of judicial elections by providing for public funding for ju-
dicial elections while drastically cutting back its regulation of judicial 
campaign conduct.222  The Tarheel State now prohibits only a candi-
219 See, e.g., Thomas R. Phillips, Electoral Accountability and Judicial Independence, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 144-45 (2003) (“[A]bout three-fourths of Americans believe that 
judicial outcomes are affected by campaign contributions.”); cf. Kozlowski, supra note 
168, at 172 (suggesting that these polls show massive public distrust of the judiciary). 
220 The current private funding system leads to considerable funding imbalances, 
with the better funded candidate usually prevailing against a less well-funded oppo-
nent.  See GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 23, at 15 (“[T]he top fundraiser almost 
always wins at the polls.”). 
221 See generally Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 563 (1999) (discussing the benefits that public funding would have for elec-
tions and government).  A less dramatic but still useful way of aiding less well-funded 
candidates and increasing voter information would be through the government dis-
semination of voter guides that contain brief statements by and about the candidates.  
See, e.g., Cynthia Canary, Know Before You Go:  A Case for Publicly Funded Voters’ Guides, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 81, 83 (2003) (promoting state-funded voters’ guides as a means of facili-
tating an informed electorate). 
222 North Carolina Public Campaign Fund Financing Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-
278.61 (2002) (effective 2004). 
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date’s solicitation of funds on behalf of a political party or candidate 
for office, endorsement of a candidate for nonjudicial public office, or 
intentionally and knowingly misrepresenting her identity or qualifica-
tions.  North Carolina no longer prohibits pledges, promises, com-
mitments, personal solicitations, or other forms of partisan political 
activity.223  The new North Carolina approach, thus, focuses on pro-
moting political expression and voter information through public 
funding and the elimination of some speech restrictions, while freeing 
judicial candidates from dependence on large donors and defending 
the autonomy of the courts from partisan executive and legislative 
politics.  To be sure, the new canons permit the kinds of pledges and 
promises that may be inconsistent with the judicial function.  But the 
combination of public funding and less restrictive canons almost cer-
tainly provides greater protection for both judicial independence and 
informed elections than does the usual pattern in most states of more 
restrictive canons without public funding.224
Second, state supreme courts, or other bodies responsible for the 
implementation of campaign codes, should consider shifting the en-
forcement of the pledge, promise, and commitment bans from sanc-
tions for campaign statements that violate the canons to the require-
ment that judges recuse themselves from cases involving litigants or 
raising issues that were the subjects of a campaign pledge, promise, or 
commitment.  This approach was suggested by the Missouri Supreme 
Court, when, in the aftermath of White, it issued an order that revised 
its canons to eliminate the Announce Clause but then added that 
“[r]ecusal, or other remedial action, may nonetheless be required of 
any judge in cases that involve an issue about which the judge has an-
nounced his or her views as otherwise may be appropriate under the 
Code of Judicial Conduct.”225
223 N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7C (amended Apr. 2, 2004). 
224 See Phillips, supra note 219, at 146-47 (calling for public funding of judicial 
elections, and citing surveys finding that judges in Ohio and Texas support public 
funding of judicial races); see also N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. COMM’N TO PRO-
MOTE PUB. CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, WITHOUT PUBLIC CONFIDENCE, THE 
JUDICIAL BRANCH COULD NOT FUNCTION 8-9 (June 28, 2004) (presenting the findings 
of the special commission appointed by New York’s Chief Justice Judith Kaye to pro-
mote confidence in judicial elections, including a recommendation for a public fi-
nancing program for judicial elections), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ 
reports/JudicialElectionsReport.pdf. 
225 Order Enforcing Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c) Campaign Conduct (Mo. July 18, 
2002) (en banc), available at http://www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf/0/ 
f1c626db4da8b14086256bfa0073b302? (last accessed Oct. 7, 2004). 
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Although requiring recusal in cases in which a judge has merely 
announced views may be too strong, recusal would be a desirable way 
to enforce many of the restrictions on campaign speech.  Given the 
uncertain scope of the canons’ restrictions, an approach that focuses 
on recusal would better protect robust debate and avoid the dangers 
of arbitrary or partisan enforcement by assuring candidates that 
speech within the gray areas would not be subject to sanction.  This 
would probably benefit challengers—and hence competitive elections 
generally—as they may be less familiar with the rules and may also feel 
the need to make sharper, more dramatic statements in order to get 
the attention of the voters.  It would also focus enforcement on the 
value threatened by certain campaign statements:  impartiality. 
Intervention by way of mandatory recusal would be most appro-
priate when it appears that a campaign statement threatens to un-
dermine the fair and evenhanded application of the law in a specific 
case.  There may be less need for the state supreme court or judicial 
conduct body to take action against a candidate if a judge’s strong 
words during a campaign are not subsequently implicated in specific 
cases or are not followed up by biased behavior while on the bench.226  
To be sure, more liberal recusal has its limitations and its critics, too.227  
But it may be the most appropriate way of reconciling judicial elec-
tions with judicial impartiality. 
That, indeed, is the dilemma for the regulation of judicial elec-
tions:  to protect and enhance the free speech, voter information, and 
electoral competitiveness essential to elections while also preserving 
judicial impartiality-as-open-mindedness and the courts’ structural in-
dependence of the other branches of government.  Judicial elections 
do not need to be run according to the same rules that apply to all 
other elections.  Indeed, some aspects of the judicial function provide 
strong support for special regulations appropriate to the judicial set-
226 Cf. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 96-97 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (Pariente, J., 
concurring) (finding that six months’ suspension, rather than removal, was an appro-
pritate penalty for violations of campaign canons where in the four years following the 
election the judge had conducted herself in an impartial manner on the bench), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 180 (2003). 
227 See Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add:  Nonpartisan Judicial 
Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1420 (2003) (noting that recusal only helps the 
litigant who is aware of the judge’s past statements and who can bear the costs of liti-
gating recusal); Shepard, supra note 63, at 1081-83 (detailing the costs of recusal); see 
also Morrison, supra note 136, at 743-44 (tentatively presenting recusal as an enforce-
ment option). 
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ting.  White notwithstanding, most of the traditional judicial campaign 
canons ought to pass constitutional muster. 
But restrictions on campaign speech and political expression 
trench on constitutional values and pose considerable line-drawing 
difficulties, and enforcement may unduly involve election commis-
sions, judicial conduct bodies, or courts in heated election disputes.  
Other mechanisms, such as public funding and recusal, might do a 
better job of holding together the competing concerns that structure 
the judicial campaign conduct problem without raising the particular 
difficulties posed by prohibiting or penalizing campaign statements or 
actions that would be protected in other electoral settings. 
 
